ARTICLE

Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital

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Abstract. At the start of the twentieth century, women made up a small proportion of shareholders in American publicly traded companies. By 1956, women were the majority of individual shareholders. Although this change in shareholder gender demographics happened gradually, it was evident early in the century: Before the 1929 stock market crash, women shareholders had come to outnumber men at some of America’s largest and most influential corporations, including AT&T, General Electric, and the Pennsylvania Railroad. This Article synthesizes information from a range of historical sources to reveal an overlooked narrative of corporate history—the feminization of capital, or the transformation of American public-company shareholders from majority male to majority female. It charts the growing proportion of women shareholders over the first half of the twentieth century, describes the business community’s response to this trend, and explores the impact of the rise of intermediation on the gender politics of corporate control.

Corporate law scholarship has never before acknowledged that the early decades of the twentieth century, a transformational era in corporate law and theory, coincided with a change in the gender composition of the shareholder class. Scholars have not considered the possibility that shareholders’ gender—which was being tracked internally at companies, disclosed in annual reports, and publicly reported in the press—might have

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influenced business leaders’ views about corporate organization and governance. This Article considers the implications of this history for some of the most important ideas in corporate law theory, including the separation of ownership and control, shareholder “passivity,” stakeholderism, and board representation. It argues that early-twentieth-century gender politics helped shape foundational ideas of corporate-governance theory, especially ideas concerning the role of shareholders. Outlining a research agenda where history intersects with corporate law’s most vital present-day problems, this Article lays out evidence showing that the feminization of capital shaped changing ideas about the role of shareholders in corporate governance. In so doing, it invites scholars to begin a conversation about gender, power, and the evolution of corporate law.
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Introduction

In 1951, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) became the first corporation in America with one million stockholders. The company celebrated the milestone with a publicity campaign, flying the one-millionth stockholder—a Michigan couple who had bought the stock jointly—to New York for a publicity tour. Photos from the campaign showed the company’s president, Leroy Wilson, presenting a stock certificate to a young automobile salesman, Brady Denton, as the couple’s school-age sons looked on. Behind them all, partly obscured by Wilson’s arm as it reached past her, stood Dorothy Denton, Brady’s co-owner, gazing into the camera lens with a strained smile. The image celebrated a young couple’s entrance into the stockholder class, but it also depicted Dorothy as marginalized in the transaction. Newspapers around the country memorialized the event and proclaimed the democratization of AT&T’s shareholder class: It had become “a cross section of America, including farmers, businessmen, clerks, mechanics, clergymen, merchants, teachers, housewives, doctors, lawyers, Civil Service workers, people who [had] retired, widows, home-town folks and neighbors.”

But this picture—the staged photo, the list of shareholder occupations that emphasized “farmers” and “businessmen,” even AT&T’s choice of a married couple as its millionth stockholder—was misleading. By 1951, most of AT&T’s individual stockholders were women. They outnumbered individual men stockholders by almost two to one. In fact, women stockholders had

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1. AT&T Fetes 1,000,000th Stockholder, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1951, at A9; see also Thomas P. Swift, Million Mark Near in A.T.&T. Holders: 75-Year-Old Company Will Be First to Boast that Number of Owners of Its Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1951, at F1.
2. AT&T Fetes 1,000,000th Stockholder, supra note 1.
3. See Million Now Own Telephone Stock: Couple Buys 7 Shares at $1,078 and Company Gives Gala Tour of New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1951, at 42. At a dinner hosted by AT&T to mark the occasion, AT&T director Arthur Page addressed Brady Denton as if he were the sole owner of the couple’s shares. See Arthur W. Page, Director, Am. Tel. & Tel., Speech Presented at the Millionth Stockholder Celebration of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company: Trusteeship in Business (May 15, 1951) (on file with author) (“Mr. Denton, you have entrusted your savings to American enterprise which is somewhat different from enterprise anywhere else in the world.”).
6. Wayne Oliver, AT&T To Make History with Millionth Holder, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10, 1951, at 27 (reporting that 244,200 of AT&T’s shareholders were men and 483,700 were women); Walsh, supra note 4. These numbers did not include joint
outnumbered men stockholders at AT&T since at least 1910. As recently as 1948, AT&T had disclosed that 43% of its stock was owned by women, considerably more than the 26% owned by men. In 1951, individual women stockholders held 12 million shares, about 41% of AT&T’s stock—more if you included stock held jointly. Women comprised AT&T’s largest stockholder demographic whether you counted shareholders by the head or by the share.

That year, the New York Times described AT&T’s April shareholder meeting, held at the company’s Manhattan headquarters, as “Ladies Day.” At least half of the stockholders who attended were women. During the

7. AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1910, at 17 (1911) [hereinafter AT&T 1910 ANNUAL REPORT]; AT&T 1950 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15; Women Stockholders: Feminine Army of 310,000 Holds Stock in 252 Corporations, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Feb. 1, 1914, at 21; see also JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY 154 (2011) [describing the “feminization of the AT&T stockholder” by the 1920s].

8. AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1948, at 9 (1949) [hereinafter AT&T 1948 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting that another 12% was held by joint accounts); see also Purely Gossip—ATT Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1941, at 15 (reporting that at the end of 1940, 42% of AT&T’s stock was held by women, 30% by men, 5% in joint accounts, and 21% by trustees and institutions, with the balance held in the name of brokers).

9. This statistic about women’s share ownership was widely reported in May 1951 and probably originated in AT&T’s promotional materials about its millionth stockholder. See, e.g., Bell Telephone Fetes Millionth Stockholder, ARLINGTON HEIGHTS HERALD, May 18, 1951, at 2; Private Ownership, DAILY REPUBLICAN (Kane & Mt. Jewett, Pa.), May 21, 1951, at 4; see also AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT 1951, at 35 (1952) [hereinafter AT&T 1951 ANNUAL REPORT]. Jointly held stock was typically assumed to be stock held by a married couple, which in the 1950s meant one man and one woman. See Wayne Oliver, AT&T Shortly Expects Its Millionth Stockholder, AUSTIN STATESMAN, Apr. 10, 1951, at A-8 (describing joint holdings as those between “man and woman”).

10. As explained more fully below, AT&T was one of several large public companies that celebrated a milestone stockholder in the early 1950s. In each case, the company organized a public-relations campaign around a milestone stockholder who was a young, white, male, married, middle-class wage earner. See infra note 405 and accompanying text. In fact, in 1952, American stockholders were evenly divided between men and women, and most were fifty or older. See KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 89-92 (presenting demographic data). These celebrations presented idealized images of shareholders, not accurate ones.

11. Women Enliven Meeting of A.T.&T. But Their Move to Make One of Them a Member of Board of Directors Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1951, at 58 [hereinafter Women Enliven Meeting] (“It was ‘Ladies Day’ at the annual meeting of stockholders of the $12,000,000,000 American Telephone and Telegraph Company yesterday, but they came off second best.”).

12. Id.; Charles F. Speare, Stock Market Shows Vitality in Face of Unsettled News, MUNCIE STAR, Apr. 22, 1951, at 31 (noting that “the presence of women was a conspicuous

footnote continued on next page
meeting, Wilma Soss, a well-known shareholder activist and the founder of the Federation of Women Stockholders in American Business, gave a short speech. She pointed out that women comprised not only 48% of AT&T’s stockholders but also more than 60% of its nearly 650,000 employees. Soss argued that women deserved representation on AT&T’s board of directors, and that the company would benefit from it. She nominated to the board a Nevada businesswoman who owned half as much AT&T stock as all seventeen of AT&T’s directors combined. Soss’s nomination was a protest gesture. There was no way for a floor nomination to succeed because there were not enough shares represented at the meeting to win a vote.

When Soss was done presenting in favor of her nominee, a second woman, Cathrine Curtis, who headed a different organization of women investors, rose to speak. She nominated a second woman candidate to the board. Like Soss, Curtis understood that her candidate stood no chance of election. Ballots were circulated while the company’s president moved on to other subjects, and then the defeat of the women candidates—and the successful election of seventeen men—was confirmed.

But the meeting wasn’t over. President Wilson invited another investor, Ella Aronstam, to present a proposal she had submitted for the shareholders' feature at the meeting. At the preceding year’s meeting, some newspapers reported that women stockholders had “far outnumbered” the men. See, e.g., Pride of Ownership, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 1950, at 36.


14. Women Enliven Meeting, supra note 11; Nomination of Grandmother to AT&T Board Defeated, supra note 13; J.R. Nevarez, A Few “Firsts” That Russia Won’t Claim, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1951, at A5 (noting that AT&T had 650,000 employees, and that more than 20% of AT&T stock was owned by roughly 250,000 of its employees).

15. Nomination of Grandmother to AT&T Board Defeated, supra note 13. The nominee, Theresa Noble, had formerly served as the chair of the board of directors of the American Silk Spinning Company. Id.; see also Women Stockholders Want Board Member, MIA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 1952, at 12-B (describing Noble as “treasurer of a textile firm”).


18. Increase Earnings and Reduce Debt: AT&T Fiat, S.F. EXAM’R, Apr. 19, 1951, at 26; Broadway Revue, supra note 13 (“Mr. Wilson directed the attendants to distribute ballots to the stockholders. While the voting was in progress the President read his message on the state of the Company.”).
consideration.\textsuperscript{19} Taking advantage of a rule enacted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only nine years earlier, Aronstam had asked AT&T to add her resolution to the materials that the company sent to its million stockholders in advance of the meeting.\textsuperscript{20} The company had included Aronstam's proposal in its proxy statement, alongside its instruction that stockholders vote against her.\textsuperscript{21}

Tiny and white-haired, Aronstam was a retired schoolteacher from Brooklyn who owned 100 shares.\textsuperscript{22} Her proposal asked the company to expand the board by one member—and to fill the vacant position with a woman.\textsuperscript{23} “I don’t expect the resolution to pass this time,” she told a reporter before the meeting, “but we will put up a good fight.”\textsuperscript{24} When the votes were tallied, more than a million shares of AT&T stock were cast in favor of Aronstam’s proposal—just over 5% of all the shares that were voted.\textsuperscript{25} Management had voted all of the proxies it had collected against the proposal.\textsuperscript{26}

AT&T’s vibrant 1951 annual meeting—alive with women, the dominant shareholder demographic, rising to give speeches, propose resolutions, and demand representation—was, in many ways, typical for its time, although it defies our present-day understanding of corporate history.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Fred Klann, \textit{Off the Beaten Path: From 2 Employees to 602,466}, MOINE DAILY DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 1951, at 19; Broadway Revue, supra note 13, at 3-4 (suggesting that the author Fannie Hurst spoke on Aronstam’s behalf).
\item \textsuperscript{21} See AT&T Shies from Women as Directors, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1951, at 29; see also New Fight Planned to Seat Woman on AT&T Directorate, S.F. EXAM’R, Mar. 14, 1951, at 30.
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Robert H. Prall, \textit{Ella Girds for the Second Round: Little Woman vs. Big Business}, N.Y. WORLD-TEL. & SUN, Apr. 17, 1951, at 22 (reporting that Aronstam was four feet nine inches tall and 103 pounds). The article noted that after Aronstam’s proposal was published in the proxy, a “Connecticut farmer” sent her a letter telling her to stick to knitting, since AT&T’s officers were doing a good job “without any women to mess up the works.” Id.
\item \textsuperscript{23} See id.; AT&T Meeting Told Company Is Striving to Increase Earnings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1951, at 18.
\item \textsuperscript{24} See Prall, supra note 22.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Increase Earnings and Reduce Debt: AT&T Fiat, supra note 18. More than 18 million shares were voted against. Id.
\item \textsuperscript{26} AT&T Shies from Women as Directors, supra note 21.
\item \textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., Saw Dawson, \textit{Influence of Women in Business Increasing}, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1950, at 25 (“The womenfolk have discovered recently what fun they can have at a stockholders' meeting, just by asking questions.”). Women were active in shareholder governance throughout this period. For example, among the first thirteen individuals to utilize the SEC’s shareholder-proposal rule in 1943 was Harriett Skipwith, who owned 3,700 shares of common stock of the White Sewing Machine Company and submitted six proposals on subjects related to the company’s corporate governance. See footnote continued on next page
Over the first half of the twentieth century, the percentage of women among individual shareholders at American public companies continuously grew until, sometime between 1952 and 1956, women became the majority. The trend was documented over six decades in ad hoc studies conducted by government agencies, journalists, investment firms, and eventually the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In 1956, the NYSE published the first comprehensive study finding that women constituted a majority of shareholders across the U.S. public capital markets. But the trend received almost no recognition in the academic literature—not in economics, corporate law, or business management, the three academic disciplines in which scholars studied and published information about the expanding shareholder class and the role of shareholders in corporate organization. This silence contrasts strongly with the scholarly attention lavished on the rise of institutional holders starting in the 1950s—a time when women’s shareholding was reaching a high point.

Women’s market-wide majority status may have been less important than the feminization of shareholding at individual companies. Before the 1929 stock market crash, women shareholders outnumbered men at some of America’s largest and most influential public companies, including AT&T, General Electric, and the Pennsylvania Railroad—the “blue-chip” companies whose CEOs and directors formed an elite cadre of business leaders. As the...
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gender of their companies’ shareholders changed—a process that began before the crash and continued after it—these men watched their managerial leadership become accountable to an expanding population of women. This change would have been apparent not only from stockholder lists, but in real-world shareholder meetings where women’s increasing presence was visible and where women’s voices were audible. But the feminization of shareholding occurred during a period in American history in which—due to then-prevailing gender bias—women were widely regarded as unsuited to participate in business management.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, several large public companies tracked and disclosed the gender of their own stockholders, and the financial press wrote numerous articles proclaiming the growing number, and common stockholding power, of women investors. Business experts expressed anxiety about women’s expanding role, sometimes suggesting that the influx of women shareholders had significance for corporate organization. Corporate law scholarship has never before acknowledged that this early period, in which control of widely held corporations shifted from shareholders to managers, coincided with a change in the gender of the stockholder class. This Article tells the forgotten story of the feminization of capital—the transformation of public-company stockholders from majority male to majority female—and argues that early-twentieth-century gender politics played a role in shaping corporate-governance theory. The Article lays out the evidence showing,

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32. This Article’s argument that capital “feminized” during the early twentieth century is, implicitly, an argument about what “capital” means. Though an economist may think of capital merely as an input—an asset put to productive use—this Article presents capital as a group of human actors, in the same way that we sometimes use “labor” to refer to the workers in a firm and “management” to mean the people managing the enterprise. Using “capital” to refer to human actors in corporate organization is useful because it allows legal theorists to focus on the social relations that shape collective enterprise through the corporate form. This article describes the “feminization” of a major category of corporate actors during a period in which sex discrimination against women was pervasive. To discern how corporate law and theory were grappling with this change, this Article examines the human identities behind the category of capital. Indeed, the sleight of hand in legal scholarship that has transformed human shareholders (that is, risk bearers) into depersonalized interests has obscured how power is expressed through corporate organization. Cf. Martin J. Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916*, at 7 (1988) (“Property in its capitalist form . . . is a complex social relation . . . that involves a system of authority inextricably interwoven with the legal and political order as well as with the broader system of legitimacy, the prevailing norms of emulative morality and behavior, and the hierarchy of power.”).

33. At the end of the twentieth century, an important article in the *Columbia Law Review* investigated “the interrelation of social norms and corporate law,” including “cultural attitudes,” and concluded that “[c]hanges in the belief-systems of corporate actors cause shifts in norms. These shifts, in turn, are translated into the fabric of corporate institutions and corporate law.” Melvin A. Eisenberg, *Corporate Law and Social Norms*, footnote continued on next page
among other things, that the feminization of shareholding encouraged corporate law experts to view shareholders as “passive” actors, and justified laws and practices that shifted power away from shareholders toward corporate managers.

During the early decades of the twentieth century, ownership of the nation’s biggest corporations became “widely scattered.” During the early decades of the twentieth century, ownership of the nation’s biggest corporations became “widely scattered.” In the conventional narrative, the dispersion of stockholding caused “passive” shareholders to lose the power of control, and a new and growing cadre of technocratic managers to gain it. The separation of ownership and control reflected the triumph of centralized corporate management over the dispersed, small shareholder. The separation framework introduced a “separate spheres” dichotomy to corporate-governance theory that not only survives to this day, but became the basis of modern corporate law. In recent years, some scholars have questioned the timing of the separation of ownership from control. Virtually everyone agrees, however, that ownership did eventually separate from control—and that reducing the resulting “agency costs” has become the singular focus of modern corporate law. Indeed, the choice to view the

99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1254, 1292 (1999). Though Eisenberg’s work did not consider gender as a source of social norms, this Article shows that cultural attitudes about gender difference have been relevant to the evolution of modern corporate law. See generally Patricia Yancey Martin, Gender as Social Institution, 82 SOC. FORCES 1249, 1266 (2004) (arguing that using gender to construct social relations is useful “primarily because of its extensive pervasiveness and intertwining with other social realms”).

34. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 9-10 (1977); see also Frederick H. Wood, The Small Investor and Railroad Ownership and Management, 11 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI CITY N.Y. 433, 433 (1926) (“In each of the last two decades the number of stockholders [in eighteen companies] has approximately doubled.”).


36. Id.


corporate law to operate within a framework of perpetually warring camps of “strong managers” and “weak owners.” 39 This Article is the first work of corporate law scholarship to suggest that the study of shareholder gender sheds light on these narratives.

The idea of the passive shareholder took off after Adolf Berle, Jr., and Gardiner Means presented it in their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 40 This Article argues, among other things, that the shareholder-passivity thesis relied on gender stereotypes and may have misrepresented the desire of small stockholders, including many women, to actively participate in shareholder governance. In the first half of the twentieth century, the typical shareholder held stock in only a few companies. 41 With governance rights in only a handful of firms, shareholders had the time and resources to attend to corporate-governance matters. Evidence suggests that shareholder interest was there as well. 42 During this period, however, corporate law evolved in a direction that de-emphasized mechanisms for shareholder collective action. The choice to view shareholder passivity as natural and inevitable helped turn corporate law away from control-based reforms, which would have empowered shareholders. Instead, shareholder passivity pushed corporate law toward market-based solutions, a trend that was formalized in New Deal securities legislation. 43 The passivity thesis helped to justify the
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40. Berle & Means, supra note 35, at 347-48. As described in further detail in Part II.B below, Berle and Means did not introduce the concept of shareholder passivity, but they were largely responsible for popularizing the idea among corporate theorists in the United States.

41. See, e.g., Temp. Nat’l Econ. Comm., 76th Cong., Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations, at xvii (Comm. Print 1940) (stating that the average stockholder held shares in “about two and one-half corporations”). Almost twenty years later, the NYSE found that the average stockholder held stock from only 3.5 different stock issues—fewer than in 1956, when the average was 4.25 issues. N.Y. Stock Exch., Share Ownership in America: 1959, at 5 (1959). But see Harold S. Sutton, Who Are a Company’s Stockholders? Utility Company Survey Discloses Wide Ownership in All Classes, 87 TRS. & ESTS. 9, 9 (1948) (showing that a 1948 survey of stockholders of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York found that 5% owned no other stocks; 12% owned two or three other stocks; 37% owned three to ten; and 51% owned over ten).

42. See infra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.

43. Morton Horwitz dates “the beginning of the shift away from ‘the traditional point of view’ of shareholders as ‘the ultimate owners, the corporate equivalent of partners and
much-celebrated shift in corporate power away from shareholders, a group that included many women, to corporate managers, a group that was exclusively male.

Although most stock today is owned by large institutions (such as asset managers and insurance companies), this was not true during the first half of the twentieth century, when most stock was held by individuals. 44 During these decades, human shareholders—individual women and men, and joint husband-and-wife accounts—comprised the vast majority of shareholders. 45 For example, in 1951, 96% of AT&T’s million stockholders were individuals. 46 The human identity of shareholders, who were viewed as members or “owners” of the corporation, was important to ideas about shareholders’ rights and interests within corporate organization. Thus, although women never collectively owned more stock than men during this period across the market, shareholders’ identities, including gender, mattered to corporate proprietors” to the turn of the century. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 95 (1992) (quoting A.A. Friedrich, Stocks and Stock Ownership, in 14 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 403, 403 (E. Seligman ed., 1934)); see also id. at 100 (“[M]odern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the directors’ absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations . . . .” (quoting HOWARD HILTON SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTORS 5 (1931))). Ariela Dubler has argued that New York’s legislature abolished common law marriage in 1933 in part because the “socio-legal conventions of female dependency” upon which the doctrine was premised had become “out of sync” with women’s changing position in the economy. Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 997-98 (2000). Dubler’s work shows how, in the 1920s and 30s, women’s evolving social and economic roles were reshaping family law—a process that was similar to, and contemporaneous with, the corporate law shifts discussed in this Article.

44. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008) (explaining that in 1932 “most shareholders were individuals”); Janette Rutterford, The Shareholder Voice: British and American Accents, 1890-1965, 13 ENTER. & SOC. 120, 121 (2012) (“Up to the 1960s and 1970s, individual shareholders were far more numerous than institutional investors and in many companies owned the vast majority of shares.”); ROE, supra note 39, at 6 (noting that “[i]n the Berle–Means era, shareholders were mostly individuals”); EDWIN BURK COX, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP 1 (1963) (“At the end of 1957 individuals owned directly 70 per cent of the corporate stock outstanding and not owned by another corporation.”).

45. For example, a 1948 survey of major manufacturing corporations found that 91% of common stockholders were individuals, and that those individuals (men, women, and joint accounts) held a combined average of 59% of outstanding issues. Who Owns ‘Big Business’? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part I—Manufacturing, 87 TRS. & ESTS. 5, 6 (1948) (analyzing data from sixty-two companies).

46. AT&T 1951 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 21.
As late as the 1950s, some companies were reporting the results of shareholder voting on both a pro rata (share) and a per capita (shareholder) basis, reflecting a continuing adherence to the traditional view in which shareholders were cognizable as people. Most experts peg the shift to institutional stockholding to the 1970s or later, even though it was recognized earlier as a development on the horizon. The intermediation of stockholding after the midcentury was itself gendered in effect. Since intermediary holders were managed by men, the rechanneling of retail stockholding through them restored male voting control over women’s stock.

What explains the rise of women’s stockholding in the first half of the twentieth century? Although many factors likely played a role—including the fact that women could and did participate in shareholder governance in large companies at a time when their participation in political governance was limited—this Article highlights an economic explanation. Women experienced sex discrimination in labor markets, but the dividends paid on a share of stock did not vary with the identity of the share’s owner. That is, the return on

47. Women did own more stock than men at individual companies, however. See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text (describing how women’s pro rata shareholding exceeded men’s at AT&T and U.S. Steel).

48. See, e.g., STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLDERS 45 n.*, 46 (1948) (providing vote totals on both a pro rata and per capita basis). In addition, some companies continued to use a voice vote to decide substantive motions brought at shareholder meetings, effectively giving each shareholder a single vote. In 1946, for example, when a shareholder of Standard Oil New Jersey moved for a vote to switch from semiannual dividends to quarterly dividends, a floor vote of shareholders resolved the matter. See STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLDERS 24 (1946). The motion failed. Id. at 25.

49. See, e.g., David M. Kotz, The Significance of Bank Control over Large Corporations, 13 J. ECON. ISSUES 407, 409 (1979) (“Whereas in 1929 less than one-tenth of outstanding U.S. corporate stock was held by financial institutions, by 1974 financial institutions held over one-third.”); COX, supra note 44, at 2 (noting “the emphasis which has been placed on the growing importance of institutional investors in the market during the 1950s” but observing that “in 1960 individual owners continue to represent the most important group of holders of equities”); J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 246-47 (1958) (recognizing the significance of institutional investors).

50. See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.

51. This Article is only a preliminary effort at answering this important question, which deserves book-length treatment. A longer work would help explain where twentieth-century American women obtained wealth (for example, through inheritance, wage labor, or other means), and how and why women saved or invested that wealth, particularly in light of then-existing gender norms, legal constraints on women’s property ownership, differences between the life expectancies of men and women, and the exclusion of women from politics.

women’s capital was not discounted for their sex. The fact that women could expect equitable returns for their investment of capital in stock, but not for their labor, may have encouraged women to save and invest in stock when possible.53 The dynamic effects of sex discrimination across labor and capital markets may help explain why, over the first half of the twentieth century, women came to outnumber men as common stockholders in the United States.54

Shareholders’ race is also relevant to this story. In the first half of the twentieth century, the great majority of American shareholders probably were middle-income and wealthy white women and men. Some women shareholders were the beneficiaries of inherited wealth, while others were investors of income earned in labor markets that were segregated not only by sex, but also by race.55 Unfortunately, data on shareholders’ race and ethnicity during this period is thin. It is fair to assume, however, that the feminization of shareholding was shaped by racial discrimination and bias.

Part I synthesizes information from a range of historical sources to present a history of twentieth-century shareholding that pays attention to gender. It offers an original and important contribution to the fields of business history, women’s history, corporate law, socioeconomics, and the study of capitalism, and a fascinating “lost history”56 that may surprise readers because, until now, there has been little recognition that women played any kind of significant role in early-twentieth-century corporate capitalism.

Part II considers the implications of this history for some of the foundational ideas in corporate law theory. These include the separation of

53. See, e.g., infra note 173 (describing a 1929 financial-advice article in Good Housekeeping that revealed how the economic reality of 1920s womanhood related to women’s investment risk tolerance). Stocks, of course, provided better returns than bonds. The fact that women had fewer options than men did to generate income over a lifetime—because women were essentially excluded from high-wage jobs—may have encouraged some women to rely on the high returns on stocks as their primary means of growing wealth.


55. The transmission of wealth from one generation to the next in white families would, of course, have reflected economic advantages conferred by centuries of American racial discrimination as well as the institution of slavery. See, e.g., STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, at xvii (2019) (exploring the ways in which “slave-owning women invested in, and profited from their financial ties to, American slavery and its marketplace”).

56. See Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1252 n.28 (1999) (“One of the projects of feminism has been to recover women’s ‘lost’ history.”).
ownership and control, the “passive” shareholder, stakeholderism, the law's reliance on the archetype of the “average” or “reasonable” investor, and board composition. As the Article shows, women became the majority of American public-company stockholders not only at a crucial time in the development of corporate theory, but also at a time when American culture viewed women as “ill-fitted” to play a role in the management of business. Considered together, these facts suggest a new interpretation for the intellectual foundations of modern corporate law.

I. The Feminization of Capital

“We are in a period of wide distribution of stock,” one Wall Street lawyer wrote in 1929. “Many thousands of new holders are persons of moderate means.” Today, the growth of stockholding is mostly remembered this way: as a socioeconomic transition that expanded shareholding beyond the wealthiest classes to middle-income Americans. But it was also significantly about the mobilization of women’s wealth. Though historians of business have not presented it this way, the expansion of shareholding reflected a decades-long transformation of the gender of shareholding—the feminization of capital, decades before labor or management at public companies reflected large proportions of women.

Relying on a range of historical sources, including corporate reports, government reports, newspaper articles, and transcripts and photos of stockholder meetings, this Part sketches the gender demographics of American public-company shareholding from the turn of the twentieth century until the rise of institutional investing after the middle of the century. The history of women as corporate shareholders could go back much further than this.

57. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 129 (1927) (asserting that women “are ill-fitted by training—begging the moot point of sex—to govern” corporations).
59. Id.
60. Julia Ott has documented the mass-investment movement of the early decades of the twentieth century. See Julia Ott, What Was the Great Bull Market? Value, Valuation, and Financial History, in AMERICAN CAPITALISM: NEW HISTORIES 63, 71 (Sven Beckert & Christine Desan eds. 2018) (describing a “new narrative about the promise of mass investment” after World War I); OTT, supra note 7, at 7 (exploring the “phenomenon of mass investment” and its political significance).
61. Indeed, women have never constituted a large proportion of corporate management at U.S. public companies. See DELOITTE GLOB. CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, PROGRESS AT A SNAIL’S PACE: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM—A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 38-39 (7th ed. 2022) (reporting that in 2021, women held 23.9% of board seats and constituted 5.7% of CEOs in the United States).
Stockholding by women is evident in the historical record long before 1900. For example, when it was chartered in 1791, at least twelve of the 194 stockholders of the Bank of New York were women. Collectively they owned only 6.7% of the bank’s total stock, but a woman, Temperance Green, was the bank’s second-largest shareholder. One early American corporate law treatise noted that a corporation “may consist of both men and women, provided, its institution is not repugnant to the condition and modesty of women.” An 1849 Pennsylvania statute forbade stockholders who lived within ten miles of the meeting place from voting by proxy, “females excepted.” In 1877, the Banker’s Magazine and Statistical Register published a small survey of the sex of stockholders in ten national banks in central New York, reporting that women constituted almost 41% of stockholders and held 31% of shares. By 1878, there were already so many women shareholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad that the corporation distributed dividends by sex; women shareholders could receive their payments a day before the men.
Readers may be surprised to learn that some public companies tracked the sex of their own shareholders and disclosed it in their annual reports. Some government agencies also tracked and reported on the sex of stockholders in the early twentieth century, particularly for the manufacturing industry and national banks. Leading financial journalists reported on shareholders’ sex, going so far as to conduct investigative reporting. These practices suggest that business leaders believed that shareholders’ sex mattered—and that information about shareholders’ sex shed light on business itself.

A. Women Shareholders in the New Century

At the turn of the twentieth century, several government agencies were tracking and reporting on the gender of corporate shareholders. Both Massachusetts and New Jersey tracked the gender of shareholders of in-state manufacturing companies. In Massachusetts, women constituted nearly a third of shareholders, while in New Jersey, the percentage of women started lower, at 16.2% in 1900, and grew to 21.4% by 1906.

From at least 1897 to 1921, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency periodically reported on the sex of shareholders in national banks. In 1904,

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for example, it reported that around a third of shareholders in national banks were women.\textsuperscript{73}

In November 1909, when sugar-trust investigations were making headlines, reports surfaced that half of the stockholders of American Sugar Refining Company were women.\textsuperscript{74} A few months later, when railway rates were under fire, newspapers published similar reports about women's stockholding at the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad.\textsuperscript{75} One
report stated that officials of the railroad were “said to be considerably alarmed over the last report which shows that women stockholders outnumber the men by 5 per cent.” The editors noted that it was “a time when the railroad would like to have none but the hardest-headed business men concerned in its affairs, and privately the officials admit that the large percentage of female holders constitute a menace.”

The first major investigative reporting on women’s shareholding appeared in 1913, when both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal published sex-disaggregated data from surveys of the stockholder lists of major companies. The New York Times study found that more than 40% of

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77. Id. Another newspaper reporting on the same issue wrote that there was “good cause for excitement” among the New Haven Railroad’s officials “as to what might happen if the women should demand a seat in the directors’ meeting.” Announcements, Mt. CARMEL MORNING REG., July 1, 1910, at 4.
78. How American Stocks Are Owned.: Corporations Representing Eight Billion in Capital Give Details About the Holdings of Investors, the Speculative Supply of Stocks, and Amounts Held Here and Abroad., in N.Y. TIMES, ANN. FIN. REV. AFR4, AFR4 (1913) [hereinafter How American Stocks Are Owned] (asserting that, from 1900 to 1912, “the number of blocks of stock held in women’s names” among 193 large corporations had “quadrupled”); Owners in Six Companies Increased 12.8% This Year: In Twelve Years Capitalization Increased 81.5 Per Cent and Number of Stockholders 204.7 Per Cent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1913, at 1 (providing data for American Sugar Refining Company, Standard Oil New Jersey, Pennsylvania Railroad, AT&T, and United States Rubber Company); In 63 Corporations Women Own Nearly 166,000 Shares: The Hand That Rocks the Cradle Already Has the Suffrage at the Corporation Polls, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1913, at 2 [hereinafter In 63 Corporations Women Own Nearly 166,000 Shares]. Both newspapers had published earlier articles on women shareholders, but those articles provided only ad hoc numbers. See, e.g., Giving Women Stockholders Precedence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1878, at 2 (reporting that, according to the Pennsylvania Railroad’s assistant treasurer, “probably $500,000” in dividends was paid to women shareholders on a day set aside for payments to women exclusively); Many Holders of Stocks: Shares of Various Corporations Very Widely Distributed, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1899, at 1 [hereinafter Many Holders of Stocks] (reporting that “[a]bout one-half of the stockholders” of Western Union were women; “about 30 per cent. of the shareholders” of Consolidated Gas Company of New York were “women and children”; and that a “goodly proportion of the Harlem Railroad stockholders” were “women, savings banks, and trustees of estates”); Many New Holders of Railroad Stock: Recent Depression in Prices Brought Many Buyers of Railway Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1907, at 12 (reporting that the Pennsylvania Railroad had 25,100 men shareholders and 22,400 women shareholders); 28,000 Women Stockholders: They Own $148,000,000 of Pennsylvania Road Shares—6,117 Since Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1908, at 1 [hereinafter 28,000 Women Stockholders] (reporting that women shareholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad numbered “about 28,000”); Women in Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1909, at SM2 (reporting “nearly 25,000” women shareholders in the Pennsylvania Railroad and 104,000 women shareholders of national banks); Country’s Shareholders Show Heavy Increase in 10 Years: Since 1901, Shareholders of Railroad and Industrial Corporations Have Been Trebled, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1911, at 2 (asserting that “from 30% to 50% of the shareholders of the great corporations are women”); Heavy Gains in Shareholders Are Reported by Corporations: Great Northern Shows Remarkable footnote continued on next page
individual shareholders in 193 companies were women; women held almost one-sixth of the companies’ stock. The influx of women to shareholding was viewed skeptically by some investors. As one explained, the fact that “women, proverbially poor investors, are now more numerous than ever before on the stock books of the companies” meant that those companies’ stocks were “out of the hands that used to protect them in the market.”

The next year, the Wall Street Journal published the results of a large study of stockholders at American companies. At 199 industrial and utility companies for which sex-disaggregated data was available, women comprised 40% of holders. At fifty-five railroad companies (and one airline), women constituted 39.5% of stockholders. The Journal’s data revealed that women made up a higher percentage of holders at companies with large numbers of stockholders: At industrial companies with fewer than 500 stockholders, women were 29.7% of the total, while at companies with more than 2,000 stockholders, women were 35% of the total, at 1 (reporting that women stockholders at the Great Northern Railway Co. had grown by over 1,000% since 1901); Shareholders of Corporations Continue to Show Increases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1911, at 1 (stating that in 1901, Boston Wharf Co. had 50,000 shares of stock that was “largely held by trustees and women”); Corporation Shareholders Now Nearing the One Million Mark: Feature of To-Day’s Installment is Report of Erie Railroad, Revealing 10,000 Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1911, at 2 (“It is estimated that women own 35% of the outstanding shares of the leading corporations.”); Railroad and Industrial Corporations with $9,000,000,000 Capitalization Owned by 873,000 Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1911, at 6 (noting, among other statistics, that “[a]bout 50 per cent of the shareholders of the American Sugar Refining Co. are of the so-called weaker sex”).

80. Of Interest to Investors, 8 INVESTMENT 231, 278 (1913).
81. See In 252 Corporations Women Shareholders Number 310,000, of Whom 130,000 Are Railroad Shareholders and 180,000 Are Industrial Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1914, at 8; Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1—Railroad Corporations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1914, at 8 [hereinafter Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1]; Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders: Table No. 2—Industrial, Public Utility and Miscellaneous Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1914, at 6 [hereinafter Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 2].
82. See Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders: Table No. 2, supra note 81. Data for 1913 shows that women were a majority of holders at sixteen companies, comprising almost 8% of companies that reported sex-disaggregated data: Adams Express (55.0%), American Bank Note (51.1%), American Express (51.1%), American Sugar Refining (52.9%), AT&T (52.5%), Cambridge Gas Light (55.2%), D.L. & W. Coal (50.7%), Eastman Kodak (65.2%), Kings Co. Electric Light & Power (50.5%), Mergenthaler Linotype (53.8%), National Biscuit (51.9%), Newark Consolidated Gas (50.7%), Otis Elevator (52.0%), Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing (60.0%), Union Natural Gas Corp. (51.5%), and United Fruit (50.2%).
83. See Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1, supra note 81. Women were a majority of stockholders at the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway. Id. Sex-disaggregated data was available for a smaller set of forty companies for 1912; women made up 40.1% of stockholders in that dataset. See id.
stockholders, 42.2% were women.84 When the Journal published an update for 1914 (covering a mostly overlapping set of 200 industrial, utility, and railroad companies), the percentage of women stockholders was 41%.85

The railroad industry in particular had relatively high numbers of women investors.86 At the Pennsylvania Railroad, the largest and most influential American railroad company,87 40% of stockholders were women by 1896.88

84. See Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders: Table No. 2, supra note 81. A similar, though less pronounced pattern was evident for railroads. Women were 33.5% of stockholders at railroads with fewer than 500 stockholders, but 40% of stockholders at railroads with more than 2,000 stockholders. See Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1, supra note 81.

85. European Holdings of American Securities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1914, at 7 (providing data on women shareholders as of June 30, 1914). In addition to companies mentioned in note 82 above, this 1914 data identified ten more companies where women were a majority of stockholders: American Book (56%), American Telephone & Cable (56.5%), Massachusetts Electric Company (52%), National Carbon (53%), Northwest Yeast (55%), Standard Oil California (65%), Standard Oil Indiana (65%), Standard Screw (55%), Union Oil of California (53%), and Western Union (51%). Id.

86. One of the earliest railroad companies in which women stockholders were reported to outnumber men was the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, which had 494 women shareholders and 345 men shareholders in 1908. See Frank Fayant, The Real Owners of America, 12 APPLETON'S MAG. 664, 667-68 (1908); Frank M. Fayant, Real Owners of America Shown in Stock Holdings: Banks, Railroads, Industrials and Other Corporations Largely in Hands of the Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1908, at 6. In the late nineteenth century, the most influential shareholder of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was a woman. See Editorial Notes, 29 WOMAN'S J. 417, 417 (1898). In 1926, the New York Times identified Emma Kennedy as the largest individual stockholder of both the Northern Pacific Railroad and the Great Northern Railway Company. James Chief Owner of Northern Roads: His Corporations Head Lists of Stockholders—Three Women Among Leading Twenty, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1927, at E11.

87. See George Brooke Roberts, Ten Pages, PHILA. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1897, at 4 (describing the Pennsylvania Railroad as "the largest corporation of the continent"); see also Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.J. ECON. 561, 563 (1930) (identifying the Pennsylvania Railroad as one of the three largest corporations in the country, and the only railroad among the top three).

88. See Solomon Huebner, The Distribution of Stockholdings in American Railways, 22 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 475, 486 (1903) ("The Pennsylvania Railroad Company reported that 40 per cent of its shareholders were women."). A quarter of stockholders of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad were women by 1900. See Women as Stockholders, MINERS' J. (Pottsville, Pa.), June 18, 1900, at 2. These percentages are roughly consistent with the findings of a recent study of United Kingdom railroad companies over the same period. See Graeme G. Acheson, Gareth Campbell, Aine Gallagher & John D. Turner, Independent Women: Shareholders in the Age of the Suffragettes 3 (Queen's Univ. Ctr. for Econ. Hist., Working Paper No. 2018-09, 2018) (finding that "women represented about 30 to 40 per cent of shareholders in each railroad company in our sample" during the suffragette movement in the United Kingdom).
Women moved into the majority temporarily in 1913 and again in 1927.89 Over the course of the 1920s, they also came to outnumber men at the Southern Pacific Railway,90 and approached half of the shareholders at the Union Pacific, Southern, and Norfolk and Western railroads.91 The high proportion of women among railroad stockholders was recognized early on as having implications for railroad companies' corporate governance. It was viewed as raising the "fiduciary burden" on managers because of women's perceived dependence on men to run the business.92 The *Railway Age-Gazette* argued that

89. The rise and fall of women stockholders at the Pennsylvania Railroad can be traced through coverage in newspapers and other publications. See *Pennsylvania Dividends. How Widely the Distribution of Profits This Month Will Spread—Many Women Stockholders*, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1907, at 6 (reporting that 46.2% of stockholders were women in 1907); 28,000 Women Stockholders, supra note 78 (47.7% women in 1908); *Wide Distribution of Pennsylvania Railroad Stock*, 71 INDEPENDENT 616, 667 (1911) (47.02% women in 1911); *In 63 Corporations Women Own Nearly 166,000 Shares*, supra note 78 (over 50% women in 1913); *Woman’s Ownership of Corporations*, CURRENT OP., Apr. 1914, at 304, 304 (48% women in 1914); *Foreign Liquidation in Railroad Securities: Statistics So Far Indicate Small Selling Abroad, but Later Returns May Show a Change*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1916, at 2 (48.6% women in 1916); *Pennsylvania Railroad Shareholders 105,638: Increase of 8,635 from November a Year Ago*, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1918, at 2 (49.3% women in 1918); H.W. Schotter, *The Growth and Development of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company: A Review of the Charter and Annual Reports of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 1846 to 1926, Inclusive* 441 (1927) (49.85% women at the end of 1926); *Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures* (pt. 2), supra note 54 (50.38% women in 1927); A.K. Darby, *Influence of Women Gains in Corporations*, EVENING SUN (Balt.), Dec. 16, 1927, at 5 (50.68% women by the end of 1927); see also Wright, supra note 62, at 239 (noting that the Pennsylvania Railroad "became known as the 'Petticoat Line' because more than half of its shareholders were female"). The percentage of women shareholders fell again in 1929. See *Women Hold Less Stock in Pennsylvania Road*, OLEAN EVENING TIMES, Nov. 25, 1929, at 8 (attributing the fall to a "recent employees [sic] stock allotment").

90. *Women Outrank Men Stockholders*, supra note 54 (noting that 45.53% of stockholders of the Southern Pacific Railway were women, while 44.99% were men).

91. See, e.g., *Union Pacific Stockholders: Women 43% of 51,016 Stockholders*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1924, at 4 (noting that women accounted for 43% of shareholders); S. Ry. Sys., Advertisement, *Woman Becomes a Partner in American Business*, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 21, 1929, at 6 (emphasizing that "[n]early one-half" of stockholders were women); *Women Outrank Men Stockholders*, supra note 54 (reporting that 48.66% of stockholders of Norfolk and Western Railway were women).

92. See *Broadening Basis of Confidence*, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1908, at 1 (suggesting that at the Pennsylvania Railroad, "the fiduciary burden is all the greater, because its holders ... are women"). This notion was expressed by corporate managers for many years. See, e.g., *Traction Control Plan to Be Revised: McNaney Heeds Expert Views on the Need of Changes in Placing Responsibility*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1921, at 5 (quoting H. Hobart Porter, Vice President of the Brooklyn City Railroad Company, as stating that "[a]bout half of the stockholders are women, and we [the directors and officers], therefore, have an unusual responsibility").
women constituted a “large dependent class” of railroad shareholders. Women were “a dependent class in two senses—financial and mental,” it asserted.

Louis Brandeis mentioned women stockholders three times in his 1914 book, *Other People’s Money*. Investors’ dependence upon banking experts had been growing, Brandeis wrote, “since women and others who do not participate in the management, have become the owners of so large a part of the stocks and bonds of our great corporations.” Later, Brandeis emphasized a connection between the proliferation of women stockholders and the general lack of aptitude of small investors. He wrote:

The small investors, particularly the women, who are holding an ever-increasing proportion of our corporate securities, commonly buy on the recommendation of their bankers. The small investors do not, and in most cases cannot, ascertain for themselves the facts on which to base a proper judgment as to the soundness of securities offered. And even if these investors were furnished with the facts, they lack the business experience essential to forming a proper judgment.

Around the same time, William Cook, author of the popular legal treatise known as *Cook on Corporations*, then in its seventh edition, offered a similar assessment. Years earlier, Cook had declared that “The Corporation Problem” was “one of the great social questions of the age” and argued that the solution lay in reinvigorating the role of the shareholder in corporate governance. This idea—that shareholder empowerment was the key to solving the corporation problem—was commonly expressed by business experts at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1905, the *Wall Street Journal* proclaimed

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93. *Half the Stockholders Are Women*, ST. LOUIS DAILY GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, Feb. 26, 1912, at 7 (summarizing undated statements in the *Railway Age-Gazette*).

94. *Id.*

95. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, *OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT* 8, 133, 199 (1914).

96. *Id.* at 8.

97. *Id.* at 199-200. Brandeis also pointed out that women were a majority of stockholders at American Sugar Refining and nearly half at two major railroads. *Id.* at 8


on its front page that “[a]nything that could be done to increase the interest of stockholders in the active management of the corporations” was worth trying.100

By the 1910s, however, Cook and other experts were changing their minds about the value of shareholder empowerment. In 1914, around the time that Brandeis published Other People’s Money, Cook argued that reformers of the corporation should not rely on more active participation by stockholders. “You might as well ask the clouds in the air to propel the railroad locomotives,” he wrote dismissively.101 “The stockholders are multitudinous, widely scattered, many of them women and estates. They give their proxies to whomsoever is in control—blindly and automatically. Even when their confidence is abused they are helpless and take their losses.”102 The writings of Brandeis and Cook connected the rise of women’s stockholding in the 1910s to stockholders’ subordination and helplessness.103 Both men suggested that corporate law should strive not to empower shareholders, but to shift power elsewhere.104

Around this time, newspapers also popularized a “war of the sexes” metaphor for shareholding that alluded to women’s claims for political citizenship. The Wall Street Journal observed on its front page that “[w]ere the

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100. The Old Colony Way, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1905, at 1 (proposing that shareholders select regional delegates to attend the annual shareholders’ meeting or that “important questions of policy might be submitted to the stockholders who could cast their ballots by mail”).


102. Id.

103. Other writings, both earlier and later, made similar associations. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 65, at 630 (stating that when a corporation had many “corporators,” “[s]ome also are women, some infants, and not a few are superannuated rich men, who desire relief from the management of their property”); Natl. Conduit Shareholders Missed Opportunity: Failure to Take Action Jeopardizes the Remaining Equity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1922, at 8 (asserting that stockholders were “gradually losing their equity through failure to take concerted action to protect their interests” and that “[o]f total stockholders, slightly less than 50% were women with small holdings”).

104. BRANDEIS, supra note 95, at 92, 188 (advocating “publicity” and “decentralization” rather than shareholder empowerment); Cook, supra note 101, at 374 (proposing to nationalize the railroads rather than empower shareholders). In at least two documented instances, companies were alleged to have taken steps to eliminate women stockholders—and, in one of the two, Asian stockholders as well. See Adams Express Company Wants Its Own Stock: Sends Letters to Stockholders Offering to Pay 190 a Share for Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1901, at 1 (describing a stock buyback scheme at Adams Express targeting only women shareholders); “Freeze Out” Charged Against Big Oil Co: Minority Stockholders Make Serious Allegations About Officers of Hercules Oil Refining Co., L.A. REC., Jan. 16, 1904, at 3 [hereinafter “Freeze Out” Charged Against Big Oil Co.] (describing a shareholder lawsuit alleging that officers and directors of the Hercules Oil Refining Company initiated a scheme to “get rid of all of the women and Chinamen stockholders”).
holders of the shares of the American Sugar Refining Co. marshalled together, the women on one side, the men on another, the latter would find themselves considerably outnumbered.”105 This sentence, which imagined female and male stockholders positioned like opponents on a battlefield, captured something of the gender politics of the era.106 At the time, women were fighting, against significant opposition, for the right to vote as citizens in political elections.107 Women would not win that right until 1920—and then only on the basis of a single vote.108 They would, however, continue to be excluded from juries in some states until 1968, reflecting continuing limits on women's authority in the public sphere.109

By the 1910s, business writers were already contemplating the managerial control implications of a large body of women shareholders. The Wall Street Journal observed that it was "unusual" for women stockholders to attend stockholder meetings, but reported "a number of women in attendance" at the 1912 annual meeting of an unidentified "well-known company," noting that the women had "manifested an unusual amount of interest in the company's

105. Million and a Quarter Owners in 327 Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1914, at 1.

106. See ROBB, supra note 74, at 59 (describing how women investors were perceived as "invading masculine space"). The New York Times, in discussing women's stockholding in 1913, predicted that "[t]he rapidity of increases is such as to suggest the presence soon of women in corporation Directorates," and noted that the increase "suggests reasons for the recent development of more generous policies in the treatment of employes [sic]." How American Stocks Are Owned, supra note 78, at AFR4.


109. The Nineteenth Amendment did not make women eligible for jury service, and some jurisdictions continued to exclude them. For example, women became eligible to serve as jurors in New Jersey state court in 1921 and were excluded from federal juries in the state until late 1936. See Comment, Women Jurors, 71 U.S. L. REV. 61, 76-77 (1937). When Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation in 1932, women were still excluded from state-court juries in Massachusetts, Florida, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and many other states. William B. Aycock, Courts—Jury—Exclusion of Women from the Jury List, 25 N.C. L. REV. 334, 336 n.11 (1947) (listing sixteen states that did not permit women to serve on juries as late as 1947). Women did not become eligible to serve as jurors in Mississippi state court until 1968. See Women on Mississippi Juries, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1968, at 33. Only in 1994 did the Supreme Court make it clear that striking a juror solely on the basis of sex violated the Equal Protection Clause. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that, in a case concerning the exclusion of men from a jury, peremptorily striking a juror solely on the basis of sex violates the Equal Protection Clause).
affairs."\textsuperscript{110} In 1914, a \textit{Washington Herald} headline announced that “women could control public utilities of capital.”\textsuperscript{111} The article stated that women owned “sufficient shares of the Washington Railway and Electric Company, Capital Traction Company, and Washington Gas Company to overturn the present managements.”\textsuperscript{112}

The \textit{Wall Street Journal} again focused on stockholders’ sex in a series of nine articles beginning in early 1916, which together comprised another large study of stockholder demographics.\textsuperscript{113} In these articles, the \textit{Journal} reported that at the beginning of 1916, women were 35% of stockholders at major copper companies\textsuperscript{114} and major oil companies,\textsuperscript{115} 37% of stockholders at industrial and miscellaneous companies,\textsuperscript{116} 40% of stockholders in tobacco companies,\textsuperscript{117} and 55% of stockholders of wire companies.\textsuperscript{118} Women were 48% of the common

\begin{footnotes}
\item 110. \textit{Women Stockholders}, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1912, at 3. Smoking was prohibited at a 1917 DuPont Company stockholder meeting due to "women stockholders being present." See \textit{Seventy-One Per Cent. of Du Pont Stock Voted Against Purchase by Company of Disputed Shares; Great Victory for Defendants}, EVENING J. (Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 10, 1917, at 1.
\item 111. \textit{Women Could Control Public Utilities of Capital: Own Sufficient Stock to Overturn the Present Managements}, WASH. HERALD, Mar. 1, 1914, at 20 (capitalization altered).
\item 112. \textit{Id}.
\item 114. \textit{Stock Ownership of the Copper Companies: On January 1 Six Had 14,765 Share-Owners, Against 15,642 Last June}, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1916, at 2. The presentation of the data is a bit confusing, because some companies broke out their common and preferred stockholders separately and had an additional third category for "women stockholders." Thus, it is not clear whether the women stockholders held preferred stock or common stock or both. The \textit{Journal} nonetheless included those companies' total stockholders in the calculation of the percentage of stockholders who were women—so the reported percentage was lower than the true percentage for companies reporting sex-disaggregated data. In the text above, I use the \textit{Journal}’s reported percentages. Some companies did not report the number of women stockholders for 1916 at all.
\item 116. \textit{Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies: Twenty-Two Corporations Show an Increase of 6.6% in 18 Months}, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1916, at 7 [hereinafter \textit{Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies}].
\item 118. \textit{Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies: Four Telephone and Telegraph Corporations, Stock 209,060,700, Had 27,757 Stockholders Jan. 1, an Increase of 33% in Eighteen Months}, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1916, at 5 [hereinafter \textit{Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies}].
\end{footnotes}
stockholders of General Electric\textsuperscript{119} and 59\% of those at Western Union.\textsuperscript{120} They also comprised 51\% of stockholders at American Express\textsuperscript{121} and 62\% of those at Eastman Kodak.\textsuperscript{122} Though only two years had passed since the \textit{Journal}’s study of shareholding in 1914,\textsuperscript{123} this data showed meaningful growth in the percentage of women shareholders—and confirmed a continuing interest among the \textit{Journal}’s readers in the gender of shareholding.

B. Women as Shareholder Activists

Louise de Koven Bowen, the daughter of a Chicago banker, became an early pioneer of shareholder activism by leveraging her considerable stockholding at several big companies to improve the companies’ labor policies.\textsuperscript{124} Bowen was a social reformer and leader in Illinois’s women’s suffrage movement when, around 1911, she began making demands on behalf of workers at the Pullman Company, where she was a stockholder.\textsuperscript{125} Bowen’s memoir, published in 1926, provides a unique firsthand account of her shareholder activism.\textsuperscript{126} After hearing about abysmal worker safety conditions, Bowen organized other Pullman shareholders, collected their grievances, and wrote repeatedly to the president of the company, threatening to “object to . . . [a] share of the profits because conditions were bad” for workers.\textsuperscript{127} Pullman’s management responded by spending a large sum to build a hospital and hire physicians for its workers; Bowen reported that workers’ health improved and she found the results of her activism “most gratifying.”\textsuperscript{128}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\bibitem{119} \textit{Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies}, supra note 116.
\bibitem{120} \textit{Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies}, supra note 118.
\bibitem{122} \textit{Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies}, supra note 116 (appearing to include both common and preferred shareholders).
\bibitem{123} See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
\bibitem{124} Today we would define Bowen’s activism as environmental, social, and corporate-governance (ESG) activism because it is related to social goals. Information about Bowen’s activism is drawn from three sources: Alice Hamilton, \textit{What a Pullman Stockholder Did: Made Managers Look Out for Men’s Health}, MERIDEN MORNING REC., June 3, 1912, at 7; \textit{What One Woman Stockholder Did}, INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Nov. 24, 1912, at 6; and \textit{Louise de Koven Bowen, Growing Up with a City} 166-67 (1926).
\bibitem{125} \textit{Bowen, supra} note 124, at 166.
\bibitem{126} Indeed, the chapter of Bowen’s book that described her shareholder activism, titled “Suffragists and Stockholders,” expressly links political and corporate suffrage. \textit{Id.} at 157-70.
\bibitem{127} \textit{Id.} at 166-67.
\bibitem{128} \textit{Id.} at 167.
\end{thebibliography}
“Flushed with my victory,” as she put it, Bowen began a new activism campaign at the International Harvester Company, whose women employees worked all night in the company’s twine mills.\textsuperscript{129} When Bowen protested the practice in a letter to the company president, she was told that the president “felt they should not employ women at night but that all the other directors did not feel the same way, and now that a stockholder had objected he would take [the matter up] with the board of directors.”\textsuperscript{130} International Harvester ended the practice, so Bowen made another demand: a “minimum wage for women.”\textsuperscript{131} The company implemented one. Bowen went on to join a shareholder campaign at U.S. Steel that sought to eliminate the twelve-hour workday, but reported that the campaign foundered when the United States entered World War I.\textsuperscript{132} In her memoir, Bowen described her philosophy of shareholder activism:

Stockholders are partners in a business in which they own shares; if they are indifferent to the conditions under which their employees work they are as culpable as if they were the actual employer, and while it is difficult to know the details of a business in which one owns stock, it is always possible to acquire this knowledge and to protest or approve at the annual meeting of the company to which all stockholders are bidden.\textsuperscript{133} Bowen’s own activism took place behind the scenes rather than at shareholder meetings. The press reported that Pullman’s management had asked her “why, if she thought so badly of the company, she did not sell her stock and free her conscience?”\textsuperscript{134} Rejecting this early articulation of the Wall Street Rule—that dissatisfied investors should simply leave—Bowen replied that she would “keep [her stock] and do something to better the conditions for the men who were working for her.”\textsuperscript{135}

C. The Expansion of Shareholding and the Great Bull Market

The bull market of the 1920s galvanized investors and placed Wall Street at the center of the popular imagination.\textsuperscript{136} By all accounts, women

\textsuperscript{129.} Id.
\textsuperscript{130.} Id. at 167-68.
\textsuperscript{131.} Id. at 168.
\textsuperscript{132.} Id. at 169-70.
\textsuperscript{133.} Id. at 170; see also id. at 165-66 ("I could not help but feel that, as a stockholder and deriving my income from the profits of these corporations, I was at least partially responsible for the grievances of which I was constantly aware, and it seemed to me that as a stockholder I ought to bring about better conditions among working people.").
\textsuperscript{134.} What One Woman Stockholder Did, supra note 124.
\textsuperscript{135.} Id.
\textsuperscript{136.} Stockholding grew significantly during the 1920s; Julia Ott has written that “[t]he number of U.S. households owning equity may have increased as much as sixteenfold.”

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participated eagerly as investors. A "trope of women-in-the-market" became popular and brokerages began hiring women to sell stock, bonds, and investment advice to female clients. As historian Julia Ott has explained, the idea of women as investors underscored both the modernity and inclusivity of the Great Bull Market. But, she points out, those who deployed the women-in-the-market trope "sought to defuse any radical implications" it might present, presumably because the role of women as stockholders remained controversial. Henry Clews, who founded the Wall Street brokerage Henry Clews & Co. in the nineteenth century, expressed "militancy against woman's participation in the business world" until near the end of his life, when he professed that he had erred. "The woman investor has become not only a reality," he asserted around 1922, "but . . . before long I expect to see her a factor in national corporation management."

over the decade. See Ott, supra note 60, at 63-64. Several factors account for the steep rise in the number of Americans who owned public-company stock after World War I. These include the Liberty Bond movement, which introduced millions of Americans to securities investment; the end of the bucket shop industry, which freed up money to be invested on national stock exchanges; and the proliferation of employee stock-purchase plans. See Robb, supra note 74, at 67-70; see also Ott, supra note 60, at 82 ("During the Great Bull Market, corporate stock distributors launched marketing, advertising, and public relations initiatives that drew upon war loan precedents to associate share ownership with political and economic liberty."); Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920-1940, 11 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 573, 586-88 (2009) (discussing the rise of stock investing in the 1920s). In addition, the enactment of a federal income tax in 1913 helped encourage Americans to purchase stocks and bonds. Robb, supra note 74, at 69.

137. See Robb, supra note 74, at 67 (noting that during World War I and over the next decade, "women's importance as investors continued apace" with growth in stockholders).


139. Ott, supra note 7, at 186-88; see Robb, supra note 74, at 71.

140. Id.

141. Id. at 187-88.


143. Id.
In 1923, Owen Young visited the headquarters of General Electric with its president, Gerard Swope, and addressed a group of the company’s foremen. A journalist later recounted how Young spoke about the apparently well-known fact that more than half of General Electric’s stockholders were women. Young “provoked laughter” by pointing out “that all the men in the Company were working for women, both in the shop and at home.” This anecdote is revealing not only because it evidenced widely shared knowledge within General Electric that women were major holders of its stock, but also because it suggested that male business leaders sometimes openly joked about women’s stock ownership as subverting traditional gender roles. The punchline, of course, was that women were expected to express authority in the home, but not in business.

Other business leaders insinuated that women stockholders were a problem for corporate capitalism. Clarence Barron, the founder of Barron’s magazine, opined that “[w]idows and orphans, as shareholders, are the curse of enterprise.” The same year, Alfred Sloan, Jr., the head of General Motors, wrote of his worry that, at some point, the “diffusion of stock ownership must enfeeble the corporation by depriving it of virile interest in management upon the part of some one man or group of men to whom its success is a matter of personal and vital interest.” Although Sloan did not mention women directly, his word choice suggests a gendered meaning. He would have known,
in 1926, that women stockholders were surging into his own company. A few
years earlier, the Wall Street Journal had reported that approximately one out of
every four General Motors stockholders was a woman.149 By 1928, 38% of
General Motors's shareholders were women and, by the late 1940s, women had
become a solid majority of the company’s individual shareholders150

It was “readily understandable” that women would invest in companies
that produced products and services used by women, like National Biscuit,
American Sugar, and AT&T, asserted the Wall Street Journal.151 “But by what
call do the ladies roam into air brakes, steel mills, lead manufacture?”152 A
recurring theme was that women only had legitimacy as shareholders when
the company produced products and services used by women. One author of an
early book on stockholders wrote that “[t]he woman stockholder should be
given prominence in the classification for some companies, particularly
 corporations dealing in household products, food stuffs, and clothing, where
such companies desire to develop the stockholder-customer idea.”153 Yet

149. General Motors Stockholders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1921, at 8 (providing this statistic and
noting that as of October 1921, women were 21% of all common stockholders and
owned 6% of “the entire issue outstanding”). Soon afterward, the New York Times
reported a significant surge in stockholders at General Motors between October 5,
1920 and April 15, 1921. According to the Times, the number of women common
stockholders more than doubled over that period, from 3,459 to 8,110—an increase of
4,651. Gen. Motors Common Now Owned by 37,787: Number of Shares Held by 8,110 Women
on April 15 was 1,467,368, Average 180 Each., N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1921, at 24. Then,
between April and October 1921, 2,114 new women stockholders became owners of
shares of common, preferred, and debentures at General Motors, increasing the total
number of women shareholders to 17,230. Many Women in General Motors: At Last
Statement 17,230 Women Were Holders of Stock, EVERY EVENING (Wilmington, Del.),
Nov. 30, 1921, at 12. From October 1920 to October 1921, then, the increase in women
shareholders for General Motors exceeded 6,000.

150. See Women Hold Stock, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1928, at 8 (noting that women held “over 13
per cent of the entire outstanding capitalization of [GM]”); Big Concerns' Stockholders All
Over U.S., CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., May 1, 1932, at A7 (indicating that 40% of General
Motors's common stockholders were women at the end of 1930); Many Women Holders
of Stocks in Big Business, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1936, at 14 (noting that at the end of 1935,
women were 47% of all General Motors stockholders); GEN. MOTORS CORP., FORTIETH
ANNUAL REPORT 1948, at 22 (1949) (noting that at the end of 1948, 83% of General
Motors's stockholders were individuals, and 56% of these were women).


152. Id.

153. Sears, supra note 58, at 61. The same idea surfaced in connection with calls for women
directors. “[Q]ualified women could undoubtedly make valuable contributions to
corporate earnings” on the boards of companies such as “the foodstuff and textile
companies, which make products which are sold largely to women,” a San Francisco
Examiner article argued in 1931. Who Owns American Business?, S.F. EXAM’R, June 16,
1931, at 24. At Standard Oil New Jersey’s 1950 stockholder meeting, a stockholder
remarked, “They also tell you that the National Dairy has put a woman on the board. I
think, since it is a national milk business, it is splendid to put a woman on the board. I
footnote continued on next page
women remained prevalent as equity investors in many major American industries, fundamentally challenging stereotypes about gender, business, and financial economy.154

The influential Harvard economist William Ripley was particularly direct in his critique of women stockholders.155 In his view—expressed only seven years after the Nineteenth Amendment gave women the right to vote in political elections—shareholder governance was less appropriate for women’s participation than political governance:

The average stockholder is entirely unqualified to engage actively in management. For a surprisingly large number of great corporations more than half of the shareholders are women—in American Telephone for 1926, 200,000 of the 366,000 were on the distaff side. Such a multitude are ill-fitted by training—begging the moot point of sex—to govern directly, less so than in politics. These business issues are far less simple, far less moral, and they make less appeal to the imagination than those in the field of government.156

Contradicting Ripley’s view, however, was the fact that women had won the right to vote in shareholder elections before they were granted the right to vote in political elections.157 Ripley’s opinion that women were suitable to “govern
directly” only matters that were “simple” and “moral” reflected common gender stereotypes of the era.158

In 1927, the Wall Street Journal published a five-part series under the headline “Woman’s Investment Invasion,” extending the gender battle metaphor from its reporting a decade earlier.159 In some detail, the articles documented the growing proportion of female stockholders at particular companies.160 For example, U.S. Steel reported to the Journal that in the ten years from 1917 to 1927, its male stockholders had increased by 10.6%, while its

158. See, e.g., SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 71-72, 179 (Free Press 1997) (1989) (describing the nineteenth-century origins of stereotypes about “women’s moral superiority” and how, in the 1920s, women started breaking out of the “strictures of Victorian morality”).

159. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Pioneering Picturesqueness (pt. 1), WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1927, at 15; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Outstanding Personalities (pt. 3), WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1927, at 8; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Ownership Distribution (pt. 4), WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1927, at 11; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151. In the years leading up to the New Deal, the idea that women were “invading” business was a recurring theme of writings on business. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Our New Peonage: Discretionary Pensions, 73 INDEPENDENT 71, 71 (1912), reprinted in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 71 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (1914) (describing “the invasion of women into industry”); Carol Bird, Women to Rule in the Financial World: Wealth of the Near Future, and with It the Command of Industry, to Be in Hands of Fair Sex if Present Trend Continues, Says Mrs. Bessie Q. Mott, of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1928, at SM10 (quoting Bessie Mott as saying that “[m]en always felt that woman . . . would never invade” the field of finance, “[a]nd yet she has, and is”); Women Invading Every Business: Even Professions Thought Sacred to Males Find Feminine Job Seekers, TRIBUNE (Scranton, Pa.), July 22, 1924, at 3 (observing that “[b]usiness sanctums of men barricaded against feminine intrusion these many years are being . . . invaded on every hand today by pioneering women”); Alice E. Cutter, Bond Houses Aid Women Investors: Entry of Fair Sex into World of Business Compels Special Service to Cater to Needs, S.F. EXAM’R, Oct. 6, 1924, at 16 (stating that “today from every walk of life we find women invading the business world”); Each Career an Individual Problem, AUSTIN STATESMAN, Mar. 9, 1924, at 8 (quoting a prominent woman stating “I do not approve of women invading the business world unless it is financially necessary”).

160. See Woman’s Investment Invasion: Pioneering Picturesqueness (pt. 1), supra note 159 (describing the appearance of women on Wall Street, with details about Victoria Woodhull and Tennie C. Claffin); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54 (summarizing sex-disaggregated data for numerous companies); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Outstanding Personalities (pt. 3), supra note 159 (reporting stories about early women investors, such as Catherine Wilkinson and Hetty Green); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Ownership Distribution (pt. 4), supra note 159 (noting, for example, that 43% of the stockholders of Union Pacific Railroad were women); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151 (noting, for example, that at American Tobacco, women constituted 40% of common stockholders and outnumbered men as preferred stockholders).
women stockholders had increased by 25.4%.

Over the course of a single year, National Biscuit Company saw its stockholder list grow by 3,359, of whom 2,030 were women.

Robert Lovett, chairman of the Union Pacific Railroad, told the Wall Street Journal that he suspected published reports undercounted women stockholders. He explained that companies and journalists determined the gender of stockholders from stockholder lists—they simply counted up the number of feminine names. However, Lovett pointed out, many names on the typical stockholder list gave initials in place of a first name, and initialed first names were “always, uniformly” assumed to be a man’s name. Since some women used initials in place of their first names, too, Lovett believed that women accounted for a greater percentage of stockholder rolls than published statistics suggested.

161. Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54 (quoting U.S. Steel’s disclosure that “while men increased 7,921, women increased 10,950” over the ten-year period); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54. An even more dramatic story had played out at General Motors, where more than 6,000 women became stockholders in one year, from October 1920 to October 1921. See supra note 149.

162. Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54.

163. Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151.

164. See, e.g., id. On naming practices for the registration of stock, see Frederick A. Wiseman, Stock Issue Problems—Registering Subscriptions, CORP. PRAC. REV., Mar. 1929, at 12, 22 (noting that women stockholders should be registered with a prefix of “Miss” or “Mrs.” and that a married woman should be identified by her own name, not her husband’s).

165. Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151 (“When a stock certificate is entered by initials in lieu of the full ‘first name’ of its owner, always, uniformly, that certificate is officially taken to be in the name of a man—and, thus, it comes about . . . that while a list of woman stockholders is bound to be a list in which the given names are women indisputably, only, a list of male stockholders is a list of men certain plus all the initialed uncertain ones.”); see also Women Stockholders Growing in Power, ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, Aug. 12, 1927, at 12 (describing the 1927 series as “a canvass of large corporations which has been conducted by Harry Alloway of the Wall Street Journal”). Business law professor J.S. Nelson confirmed, based on personal experience, that this gendered assumption endures in the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Hannah Sparks, Microsoft Patents New Software That Can Detect When Employees Are Lazy, N.Y. POST (updated Dec. 3, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://perma.cc/C56K-F7CM (assuming erroneously that law professor J.S. Nelson is a man).

166. See Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151. In addition, it is possible that women were the primary beneficiaries of stock held in trust. Although this seems to have been a widespread assumption at the time, I have found no empirical studies of the sex of trust beneficiaries from this period. Since stock held in trust was voted by the trustee, not the beneficiary, companies categorized it separately from stock owned by individuals. See Lillian Doris & Edith J. Friedman, Corporate Meetings, Minutes, and Resolutions: Containing Forms and Precedents as Well as a Commentary Upon the Legal Principles Involved in Questions Requiring

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The *Waterbury Republican* noted that if the trend continued, “we shall reach a point where our largest industries are controlled by women.” 167 Barron’s magazine scoffed at this suggestion: “There is not the least prospect or likelihood of any such petticoat majority as the Waterbury Republican assumes,” Barron’s wrote, deploying a common pejorative term for women. 168 Women’s stockholding was “not likely to be a decisive voting factor in the lifetime of any reader of these notes.” 169 Representation of women among shareholders was “rather like their exercise of the franchise,” Barron’s argued: “Not 25% of them take the trouble to register.” 170

On the eve of the Great Crash, women were active as brokers, as investors, and as shareholders. 171 Twenty-two brokerage houses in New York had women partners, as did nine in Los Angeles, three in San Francisco, and two in

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167. *Stock and Votes for Women*, BARRON’S, Aug. 29, 1927, at 12 (providing comments from the *Waterbury Republican*); see also Darby, supra note 89, at 50 (noting that women “are in position to wield tremendous influence in the election of directors if they choose to pool their holdings” at various companies). The *Independent* argued that the *Wall Street Journal*’s findings about women stockholders had “social import”: “Women are much more sentimental than men. Conscious of their control of American industry they might effect some interesting changes in the relationship of capital and labor.” Editorial, *The Sexes in Industry*, 119 INDEPENDENT 221, 221 (1927). In contrast, a corporate lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell, who opposed nonvoting common stock, acknowledged that “recognition of the voting rights of all common stockholders may lead to greater control by employees or customers,” but argued that “the social consequences of changing the law . . . will be beneficial.” Eustace Seligman, *The Relation of Law to the Modern Developments in Property Ownership*, PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CITY N.Y. 442, 443 (1926).


169. Id.

170. Id.

171. In 1931, the *New York Evening Post* published an original study of stockholders’ gender at forty-four large corporations, a group that included railroads, industrial companies, and utilities, for the four years from 1928 to 1931. The study concluded that women were about 41% of stockholders at these companies. See Otto W. Helbig, *Women’s Holdings Rise in Stock Lists*, N.Y. EVENING POST, June 13, 1931, at 1 (financial section).
Philadelphia.172 Women of modest means were purchasing common stock.173 Women also asserted an active role in shareholder governance by participating in stockholder meetings, especially in defense of workers.174 One writer predicted that when the history of the bull market was written, it would recognize that “women for the first time in this country on a large scale financially became people,” that is, an acknowledged part of the “vast new trading capitalist class.”175

172. Flynn, supra note 67, at 26; see also Robb, supra note 74, at 76 (“The number of women stockbrokers more than quadrupled during the 1920s . . . .”). This was a change from just a decade earlier, when, for example, the Consolidated Stock Exchange of New York, the primary competitor of the New York Stock Exchange, specifically banned its members from “in any way cater[ing] or encourag[ing]” securities dealing by women. Consol. Stock Exch. of N.Y., By-Laws art. III, § 15, reprinted in Regulation of the Stock Exchange: Hearings on S. 3895 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 63d Cong. app. at 783 (1914).

173. Good Housekeeping, which offered advice to a young widowed mother about how to invest her savings of $15,000, provided a snapshot of the trend. See Ruth Boyle, Your Money’s Worth: A Widow’s $15,000, Good Housekeeping, Jan. 1929, at 96, 209. The magazine consulted two investment advisers—one a man, the other a woman. See id. The male adviser, emphasizing preservation of capital, recommended only bonds; his proposed investments would have yielded $775 annually. See id. The woman adviser, seemingly concerned about the widow’s future economic prospects and independence, proposed investments of greater risk with “promise of increasing in value.” See id. She advocated including preferred and common stock in the widow’s portfolio, a mix that would have yielded a yearly income of $805. Id. The article revealed how gender politics were shaping both the advice given to investors and investors’ choices, and how the economic reality of 1920s womanhood related to women’s investment risk tolerance. See id.

174. See, e.g., Fight Is On. Fitchburg Stockholders in Session, Bos. Globe, Mar. 21, 1900, at 5 (describing nearly twenty women present among 300 at a special meeting of the stockholders of the Fitchburg Railroad, and describing a woman stockholder, Mrs. French, taking the floor to give remarks and making and later withdrawing a motion); Pay for Jobs Lost Through Merger. Women Stockholders of Steamboat Company Remember Faithful Employees [sic], New-York Trib., Oct. 15, 1904, at 1 (describing two women stockholders insisting that merger proceeds be set aside for workers who lost their jobs); supra Part I.A (describing the activism of Louise de Koven Bowen); Make Appeal for Carmen: Mrs. Evans Proposes Arbitration, Bos. Daily Globe, June 25, 1912, at 10 (describing a woman stockholder of the Boston Elevated Railway Company criticizing management decisions related to labor relations and demanding that the company allow its employees to unionize); B. & M. Holds Its Annual Meeting: Mr Bogigian Demands Facts and Figures, Bos. Globe, Oct. 10, 1917, at 11 (describing two women stockholders at the Boston & Maine Railroad’s annual meeting, at least one of whom spoke); Am. Tel. & Tel. Develops Along Normal Lines: Increase in Capital Necessary to Take Care of Contingencies Coupled with the Continued Growth, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1923, at 2 (describing “a big sprinkling of women” at AT&T’s 1923 annual meeting); Stalemate Ends Final Parley. Traction Interests Fail to Reach Compromise, Cin. Enquirer, Feb. 9, 1924, at 20 (describing a “protective association” formed among more than 4,000 “women stockholders” to “look after the rights” of the Cincinnati Street Railway Company).

175. Barnard, supra note 138, at 406 (emphasis added).
D. The Modern Corporation and Private Property

In 1932, Adolf Berle, Jr., a law professor, and Gardiner Means, an economist, published what would become the single most influential book in American corporate law: *The Modern Corporation and Private Property.*176 The pair collaborated on the book from 1927 to 1932.177 A core insight of their work was that, as America’s productive wealth was being concentrated into large, publicly held corporations, ownership of corporations was separating from control.178 “Economic power,” they wrote, was “tending more and more to concentrate in the hands of a few corporate managements.”179 No company better exemplified the separation of ownership and control than AT&T, “perhaps the most advanced development of the corporate system.”180 *The Modern Corporation* also repeatedly characterized small, dispersed shareholders as “passive agents,” “passive owners,” and owners of “passive property.”181

1. Gender and companies under “management control”

A major section of Berle and Means’s book was devoted to classifying “control” at the 200 largest American companies at the beginning of 1930.182

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178. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 3.

179. Id. at 9.

180. Id. at 3; see also id. at 4-5 (“Separation of ownership and control becomes almost complete when not even a substantial minority interest exists, as in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company whose largest holder is reported to own less than one per cent of the company’s stock.”). Berle and Means’s “favorite example” of the trends they memorialized in the book was AT&T, which between 1927 and 1932 was among the American companies with the highest proportion of women stockholders. McCraw, supra note 177, at 582 (describing AT&T as Berle and Means’s “favorite example”); see also Helbig, supra note 171.


182. They found that “ultimate control” resided with the management of 44% of the 200 companies they analyzed. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 94. This group included “management control”—no single important stock interest (the group analyzed in Table 1 below), “majority of stock believed to be widely distributed and working control held either by a large minority interest or by the management, presumably the
(Some other important contributions of the book are explored at greater length in Part II below.) As part of their empirical analysis, Berle and Means identified twenty-one companies “known to be” under management control because their stock was so widely dispersed. 183 Table 1 provides data on the gender of stockholders at these twenty-one companies. For twelve of the twenty-one, data on stockholder gender was published on at least one date between 1920 and 1932. Among these twelve companies, women stockholders outnumbered men at six, and the other six had large proportions of women stockholders, ranging from 37% to “nearly half.” 184 For seven of the remaining nine companies, data on stockholder gender was published at least once before 1920 (but not after 1920); at all seven, significant proportions of women stockholders were reported before 1920, ranging from 25.34% at the Missouri–Kansas–Texas Railroad Company (1913) to 45.7% at the New York Central Railroad Company (1916). Figures are reported to the closest ascertainable decimal place.

183. Id. at 94, 107-09 tbl.7.
184. Although women stockholders outnumbered men stockholders at General Electric in 1921, the percentage of women stockholders later dropped. See supra note 145 (describing data on stockholder sex published in General Electric’s annual reports).
### Table 1
Berle and Means’s Twenty-One Companies Under “Management Control”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Women Stockholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>Women outnumber men in 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Union Telegraph</td>
<td>Women outnumber men in 1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric</td>
<td>Women outnumber men in 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway</td>
<td>Women outnumber men in 1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Railroad</td>
<td>Women outnumber men in 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Pacific</td>
<td>Women outnumber men in 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore and Ohio Railroad</td>
<td>Women 44% in 1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Northern Railway</td>
<td>Women 44% in 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Pacific Railway</td>
<td>Women 43% in 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Pacific Railroad</td>
<td>Women 43% in 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Railway</td>
<td>“Nearly one-half” women in 1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Steel</td>
<td>Women 37% in 1930</td>
</tr>
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185. AT&T 1910 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
186. Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies, supra note 118.
187. GEN. ELEC. CO. THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 8 (reporting figures showing that women were 50.15% of all stockholders); see also Herman Bernstein, Owen D. Young: The New Type of America’s Industrial Genius, 2 McClure’s 384, 385 (1926).
188. Atchison’s Stock Is Widely Held, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1926, at 3 (“Of the individuals owning Atchison stock, 25,939 are men, with a total of 1,375,984 shares and 30,083 are women, owning 995,357 shares.”).
189. See Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54; A.K. Darby, Union Trust Company Directors to Consider Increasing Capital Stock, BALT. EVENING SUN, Dec. 16, 1927, at 50. By 1932, the percentage of women stockholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad had dropped to 43%. P.R.R. Stockholders Up, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1932, at 1.
190. Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54 (reporting that 45.53% of stockholders were women and 44.99% were men).
193. Id.
194. Helbig, supra note 171.
196. Flynn, supra note 67, at 25; see also William H. Crow, Some Aspects of Extensive Stock Distributions, 4 CORP. PRAC. REV. 46, 54 (1932) (stating that women constituted 36% of U.S. Steel’s stockholders in 1931).
The data establishes a correlation between companies under management control and those with a high proportion of women shareholders, but Berle and Means did not note this phenomenon. Indeed, though data on women's growing role as shareholders was widely available at the time, the whole subject of women's stockholding is missing from their book. The omission


200. *Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders*, Table No. 1, supra note 81.

201. *European Holdings of St. Paul Stocks Over 7%*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1914, at 5. At the time, this was the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad.


203. *Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders*, Table No. 1, supra note 81.

204. Berle and Means did identify two women among the twenty largest stockholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 85 tbl.10. They would certainly have been aware of the growing proportion of women stockholders. For example, in April of the year that *The Modern Corporation* was published, the *Corporate Practice Review* asserted that women constituted "30 to 50% of the aggregate shareholders of most listed corporations." Crow, supra note 196, at 54. The preceding year, the *Wall Street Journal* had published articles revealing that most stockholders at IBM were women, that 48% of the stockholders of General Foods were women (including individual and joint stockholding), and that more than 100,000 women stockholders at the Pennsylvania Railroad owned one-third of its stock. See *IBM Holders Gain: Increase 20% During 1930*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1931, at 7; *General Foods Holders: About 48% of 44,400 Owners of Company Shares Are Women*, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1931, at 17; *Pennsylvania Average Holdings*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1931, at 9. Berle and Means noted that they relied upon newspapers as a source of information on stock holdings of the companies they studied, which suggests that they would have seen news coverage of the feminization trend. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 91.
of women is particularly noteworthy in light of Berle and Means’s admonition that "[t]he passing of ownership from the hands of the managing few to the hands of the investing many raises the question of who these multitudinous investors may be, from what income classes they are drawn—in other words, who the owners of the nation’s industries now are." Berle and Means did not answer their own question. Who were these “multitudinous investors”? An increasing proportion were women.

2. The customer stockholder

Berle and Means did opine briefly that “two comparatively new developments” had “contributed in very large measure to the increase in the number of stockholders—ownership by customers and ownership by employees.” Their discussion of customer stock ownership may have been an oblique reference to women stockholders. Evidence from the 1910s and 1920s suggests that some business experts consigned women shareholders to the category of “customer-stockholders,” or perhaps used the term euphemistically to mean women. After all, it was as customers, rather than as shareholders, that women’s participation in business conformed to gender stereotypes.

205. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 59.
206. One might think that legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s—a group to which Berle and Means are sometimes assigned—would have noted the “social reality” of women’s rise as stockholders. As William Bratton points out, however, scholars disagree about whether Berle and Means truly were legal realists. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 740-41 (2001). To a large extent, the corporate law literature’s depiction of the expansion of stockholding in the 1920s—which has overlooked women completely—traces back to the work of a few economists, including Gardiner Means, who studied the diffusion of stock ownership in the 1910s and 1920s. See, e.g., Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.J. ECON. 561, 591 (1930) (finding that “a great distribution of stock ownership took place during the war and immediate post-war periods, increasing both the number of stockholders and the proportion of corporate industry owned by persons of moderate means”). For his part, Means presented the expansion of stock ownership in terms of socioeconomic class, and never directly discussed women stockholders. See, e.g., id. at 571 (contrasting stock ownership “by the rich” with ownership “by the less well-to-do”). Means’s study expanded on an analysis published by H.T. Warshow in 1924, which only briefly discussed women stockholders. See H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 39 Q.J. ECON. 15, 33 n.2 (1924) (describing correspondence between the author and the National Biscuit Company in which the company raised the subject of women shareholders).
207. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 56.
208. But see id. at 59 (discussing how “a new market for corporate securities was sought in the man of smaller income, the employee and the local customer”).
209. See, e.g., OTT, supra note 7, at 166 (customer ownership programs “associated stockownership with consumption and all its traditionally feminine connotations”).
framed in terms of their consumer purchasing, rather than in terms of shareholder governance or business oversight. For example, in 1918, Ward & Mackey Biscuit Co. ran ads proclaiming that “We Want Women Stockholders,” because women “do 90 per cent of the buying.” The ads explained,

It is women who say what should be bought and what should not be bought for the home. Hence it is that we want women as our stockholders as well as men, because women choose and buy the family Bread—and if they own an interest in this Company they will naturally always demand its Superior Bread Products.210

National Biscuit Company took a similar view a decade later. Its corporate secretary asserted that “there is only one class of stockholder we are really interested in keeping track of and that is, the number of women stockholders, as they are the real purchasers of this company’s product.”211 And a decade after that, one scholar wrote that business executives were “quick to realize the importance of women’s shareholding “in view of the fact that about 85% of the retail purchasing is done by women.”212 Berle and Means discussed “customer ownership” in a few paragraphs without ever mentioning women, asserting that customer ownership did not “appear[] likely to affect an appreciable proportion of all stock ownership.”213

E. Women Move into the Majority

The feminization of the stockholder class continued, unabated, after the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Studies in the 1930s and 1940s continued to find that women were a growing proportion of shareholders.214 In 1939, Monsanto Chemical Corporation published a detailed

210. Ward & Mackey Biscuit Co., Advertisement, We Want Women Stockholders—We Need Them More Than We Need Their Money, PITT. PRESS, Mar. 12, 1918, at 12.

211. Warshow, supra note 206, at 33 n.2; see also SEARS, supra note 58, at 61 (“The woman stockholder should be given prominence in the classification for some companies, particularly corporations dealing in household products, food stuffs, and clothing, where such companies desire to develop the stockholder-customer idea.”).

212. Crow, supra note 196, at 54.

213. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 56.

214. For example, a 1936 study by Frazier Jelke & Co. found that 48% of the stockholders of twenty-seven “representative” companies were women. Half of Stockholders of 27 Companies Women, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 24, 1936, at 15; see also MARY SYDNEY BRANCH, WOMEN AND WEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF AMERICAN WOMEN 53 (1934) (noting that “women made up on the average 43 per cent of the stockholders”). A 1948 study of major manufacturing corporations reported that women stockholders outnumbered male stockholders at 23 of 31 companies that had sex-disaggregated data for their common stockholders. Extrapolating from this data, the survey’s authors estimated that “women comprise 51% of all common stockholders” in a survey sample of 120 corporations. Who Owns ‘Big Business’? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part I—Manufacturing, supra note 45, at ? A study published the following year found similar results for major banks. Women stockholders outnumbered men.
The “ladies” had been “moving into the spotlight in many corporate sessions,” the Wall Street Journal reported in 1949. Throughout this era, corporate managers attended the annual meetings that put them face-to-face with the company’s “bosses”—increasingly women. Contemporaneous


216. Who Owns Monsanto in Cincinnati?, supra note 215, at 20-30. All the shareholders shown in photos appeared to be white; the descriptions suggested that all were middle-class or wealthy.

217. Louise Gamble’s husband, Cecil Gamble, appeared in a photo in her place. The photo caption made clear that it was Louise, and not Cecil, who owned stock in Monsanto. Id. at 29.

218. Owners Arise! Annual Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed Questioning, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1949, at 1. The authors of a 1948 survey on stockholders in manufacturing companies expressed surprise at the high proportion of women stockholders “not only in the more lady-like type of business but in such rugged and sometimes variable enterprises as copper mining, oil refining, steel, tobacco and aircraft manufacture.” Who Owns ’Big Business’? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part 1—Manufacturing, supra note 45, at 7.

219. A number of accounts during this period reported that women equaled or outnumbered men at annual meetings. See, e.g., Also Rationed: Gen. Foods Head Cites Policy on Dividends, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1943, at 16 (reporting that General Foods Corporation’s 1943 annual meeting “was attended by about as many women as men”); Women of Steel Give Top Brass a Hard Time, LIFE, Mar. 13, 1950, at 46, 46 (stating that women made up more than half of attendees at a 1950 shareholder meeting of U.S. Steel); see also George Koether, GM’s Fifty Years of Men, Money and Motors, LOOK, Jan. 7, 1958, at 14, 23 (characterizing stockholders as directors “bosses”).
photos of annual meetings of big companies—AT&T, General Motors, U.S. Steel—show significant attendance by women, confirming firsthand accounts that depicted women as active participants, not only on board representation but on all matters of business.220

In 1954, the Chair of the SEC likened the pace of investment—and its social impact—to “the rush to settle the West.”221 When G. Keith Funston took the helm of the New York Stock Exchange in 1951, one of his first acts was to commission a census of stockholders.222 This initiative grew into a series that documented changes in the gender and socioeconomic demographics of stock ownership. The first stockholder census reported that, in 1952, roughly the same number of men and women owned public-company stock in the United States across the market.223 Every successive census—in 1956, 1959, 1962, and 1965—found that women stockholders outnumbered men stockholders.224


223. KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 90 (stating that there were 3,230,000 female stockholders and 3,260,000 male stockholders in the United States); id. at 75 (“Of the estimated 27.4 million shareholdings in common stocks, about 10.3 millions or 37.5 per cent are in the names of women. The comparable figures for men are 10.2 millions and 37 per cent.”); see also Wubbels, supra note 27, at 3 (discussing an unidentified “recent survey” which found that 51% of all stockholders were women).

224. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 29, at 6 (showing that in 1956, women were 51.6% of individual stockholders); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, at 9 (1960) [hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959] (showing that in 1959, women were 52.5% of individual stockholders); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE 17 MILLION: 1962 CENSUS OF SHAREOWNERS IN AMERICA 6 (1963) [hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE 17 MILLION] (showing that in 1962, women were 51% of individual stockholders); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHAREOWNERSHIP U.S.A.: 1965 CENSUS OF SHAREOWNERS 6 (1966) (showing that in 1965, women were 51% of individual stockholders). Starting in 1954, the NYSE launched an advertising campaign with “advertisements frequently featuring husbands and wives talking together about stocks, with wives explicitly looking to their seemingly more
After the publication of the first stockholder census, a University of California economist, William Crum, recommended in the *Harvard Business Review* that companies standardize public disclosures of sex-disaggregated data about their shareholders. Crum offered no explanation for the recommendation and, in an accompanying article, did not discuss the recommendation. Apparently, the usefulness of sex-disaggregated information about stockholders was self-evident to a reader of the *Harvard Business Review*.

Writers tended to assume that women came to stock ownership mainly through inheritance, or that men were putting stock in their wives' names for tax reasons. As late as 1978, the head of AT&T's stock and bond division told the *New York Times* that “[a]ll the women owners would suggest a lot of widows.” The implication was that women were not "real" stockholders with the aptitude and interest to participate in corporate affairs. But these

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226. See Crum, supra note 225, at 36 (suggesting in general terms that data concerning “other characteristics of the corporation’s individual stockholders” could be useful).

227. See, e.g., *Who Owns American Business?*, supra note 153 ("Women bulk so large on the [stockholder] list today because of inheritances and gifts."). In an early study of the diffusion of stock ownership, Gardiner Means considered the matter of wealthy men putting stock in their wives’ names for tax purposes. Means, supra note 206, at 582. Means’s study, based on income-tax returns, proclaimed a “shift of almost revolutionary proportions” in stock ownership from 1916 to 1921: He found that the very wealthy owned 57.2% of corporate stock in 1916, but only 36.8% in 1921, while “individuals with small to moderate incomes” increased their ownership from 21% to 44% over the same period. *Id.* at 573-74. In producing his analysis, Means considered whether the income tax data was distorted because men were distributing their stock among members of their families, including their wives, to save on taxes. *See id.* at 582. He concluded that less than one-eighth—and “probably” not more than one-twentieth—of the shift in ownership was attributable to married couples splitting their incomes and filing separate tax returns. *Id.* at 584. Means attributed the rise in stock ownership by low-income and middle-income Americans during and immediately after World War I to several factors: a surtax on the highest-earning taxpayers, the receipt by lower-income workers of greater income, and the Liberty Bond campaigns. *Id.* at 585.


229. For an example, see J.A. Livingston, *Funston Abets Myth That Women Control Wealth*, WASH. POST, June 26, 1959, at B8 (conceding the “statistical side of the story” but arguing that “[m]any women own stock in name only” because “women in our society have a big enough job—raising children and running the household”). The academic statistician Edwin Burk Cox, who published a major study of shareholder demographics using 1960 data, openly refused to recognize married women as legitimate stockholders. Cox wrote, “Women are often the legal owners of stock only because their husbands chose to register the stock that way. It would be misleading to...
assumptions relied on gender stereotypes and ignored the changing role of
women as economic actors. Among other factors, the "rise of the
independent business woman, who is buying investment securities out of her
own earnings," contributed to women's growing participation in business as
shareholders.

In its censuses, the NYSE surveyed stockholders to learn how they first
came to acquire stock. In 1952, it found that fewer than one third of women
stockholders had acquired stock primarily by inheritance or gift; most women
cited profit-driven reasons for buying stock, like most men. The 1959
stockholder census surveyed new stockholders—those who had acquired stock
for the first time since 1956—and found that only 17% of new women
stockholders had inherited their shares. A full quarter had acquired stock
through their employers; the greatest proportion had purchased stock
through a broker. A different reason may help explain why a large number
of women were investing in common stock. Due to sex discrimination,
women's wage labor was poorly compensated relative to that of men. But

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footnote continued on next page
the dividends paid on a share of stock were the same for all owners, regardless of their sex. The fact that women could expect equitable returns for their investment of capital in common stock may have encouraged women to save and invest when possible. Thus, sex discrimination itself may have played a role in the feminization of capital. Although little historical work has been done to understand why women moved into purchasing stock in large numbers at this time, it seems likely that a significant part of the trend can be attributed to the working, saving, and investing habits of American women during this period.237

After World War II, women shareholders began publicizing the feminization of capital in an attempt to harness its power. A shareholder campaign to put women on boards of directors began in the late 1940s and continued for many years, though it suffered a setback in 1954 when the SEC narrowed the Shareholder Proposal Rule.238 Wilma Soss described herself as the leader of the "women's economic suffrage movement"239 and spoke of women's "right to be represented on the boards of large corporations" because of their domination of stockholder rolls.240 Yet women's efforts to translate their significant shareholding into managerial power were met with resistance.

An exchange on the floor of the shareholders' meeting of Standard Oil New Jersey sheds light on the gender dynamics of corporate power during this era. At every annual meeting from 1947 to 1952, shareholders had risen to ask the company to add a woman to the board of directors.241 Every year, Standard

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[237] Cf. Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: How Wall Street's Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 175, 204 (2010) (noting that "the limited statistics that are available" from the 1930s "raise questions about whether the widow/orphan storyline captured all women's stock market experiences"). Another possible factor was the rise of the woman's club movement at the turn of the century. One writer suggested that, by putting women in charge of woman's club investments, the trend "educated many women to a broader view of financial conditions and in the ethical questions involved, in handling the money of others." Henrotin, supra note 72, at 54.


[240] Logan, supra note 27, at 34.

[241] In addition to the 1953 transcript quoted in the text and cited below, I have reviewed condensed stenographic transcripts of Standard Oil New Jersey's annual stockholder meetings from 1945 through 1952.
Oil’s executives gave the same response: The company did not discriminate against women, but no qualified woman had ever presented herself.

When the subject was raised again at the 1953 meeting, one exasperated shareholder pointed out that there were “109,000 women shareholders and 90,000 men” at the company. “It looks ridiculous that there isn’t at least one woman with enough sense to be on the Board,” she said.242 Standard Oil New Jersey’s chairman, Frank Abrams, repeated the company’s pat response: “[W]hen we find a woman who can contribute to the problems we have to face on the Board and help us in their solution we will be glad to get her help.” Then he said:

I know that there are lots of things that we don’t see that women wouldn’t miss. I was going to say that first they would start with our interior decorating which may not be good—but I know there are lots of things they would be helpful with. But on the average, I don’t think, in all fairness to us, that we have found a woman who could make the contribution of a man.243

His words revealed not only blatant sexism, but also the confidence of a corporate leader who knew that his own control over the levers of firm power—control granted to him by corporate law—allowed him to insult a major group of stockholders with impunity.

Indeed, the presumption endured that women were low-quality shareholders. One male writer observed in 1949 that “many” American investors were “women unversed in finance . . . with little understanding of industry or its problems. If they are to become members of the corporate family in any real sense, they must be ‘educated.’”244 In 1948, the board chair of General Foods, Clarence Francis, used the company’s Stockholder News to scold its women stockholders. Francis acknowledged that “[o]n the record,” women were “the owners” of the company.245 “[B]ut,” he asked women stockholders, “just how interested are you really in the success of your company?”246 Francis

242. The transcript of this exchange was published in the company’s condensed stenographic transcript of the 1953 annual meeting, which it sent to its stockholders. STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), ANNUAL MEETING: MAY 28, 1952, at 19-20 (1953).
243. Id. at 20.
244. John Beachy Slocum, The Use of Public Relations Activities by Management as a Means of Securing Stockholders’ Cooperation 10 (Aug. 1949) (M.B.A. thesis, University of Southern California) (ProQuest). As another example, a 1948 Associated Press article described female stockholders “weigh[ing] one tidbit of gossip against another” to form views about a business and quoted one woman who said, “The pictures and colors in [annual] reports are nice, but there are just too many different figures for me.” Women Stockholders Ignore Annual Reports, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), July 8, 1948, at 8A.
245. Slocum, supra note 246, at 67. At the time, women stockholders outnumbered men three to two. See id. at 86.
246. Id. at 67 (quoting a spring 1948 newsletter to General Foods stockholders).
said he had been “disturbed and shocked” to learn the results of a survey “made recently among you women shareholders” that showed that the average female stockholder could name only three General Foods products.247 Francis had apparently overlooked the survey’s implicit finding that women stockholders were mainly interested in the company as an investment rather than as a source of consumer products.

“You read that women are the majority owners of our enterprises,” financial columnist J.A. Livingston wrote in his 1958 book The American Stockholder.248 “And so, we are told never to underestimate the financial power of the female. But neither, it must be said in a quiet aside, should we overestimate women.”249 Livingston was a “personal friend” of the prominent Yale corporate law professor Bayless Manning, who published an important review of Livingston’s book in the Yale Law Journal.250 In his review, Manning sharply criticized the movement for corporate democracy, noting that “[n]early all” of its “planks”—including “more representation for women” on boards of directors—“find their analogues in the reform agitations of 1900,” such as “women’s suffrage.”251 “One would be brave indeed at this date to raise any question about the nineteenth amendment,” Manning quipped; otherwise, he said, “the success of these political reforms,” such as the referendum and proportionate representation, “has been at best debatable.”252 By signaling his approval of Livingston’s sharp words for women shareholders and adding his own aside about women’s suffrage, Manning gave credence—and an academic patina—to the view that women shareholders were unimportant.253

Wilma Soss, pioneer of the “economic suffrage” movement for women, held a different view.254 “It’s a shameful fact that women own companies but

247. Id.
249. Id.; see also id. at 33 (‘Housewife-shareholders will be more interested in souffles and garbage disposals than in the movement toward corporate democracy.’).
251. Manning, supra note 252, at 1486-87.
252. Id. at 1487.
253. Manning’s book review spent several pages detailing the results of the 1952 and 1956 NYSE shareowner surveys but omitted any mention of women—neatly sidestepping the surveys’ findings that roughly half of individual stockholders in 1952 were women, and that, in 1956, women constituted the majority of individual stockholders. See id. at 1478-81. The surveys themselves treated these as headline findings. In 1964, Manning became dean of Stanford Law School. Chronology of SLS Leadership, STAN. L. SCH., https://perma.cc/T7C3-REC7 (archived Feb. 12, 2022).
can’t get top jobs in them,” Soss asserted. Soss’s activism emphasized the economic power of women and sought to organize women shareholders for collective action. She recruited prominent women as officers and trustees for her organization, the Federation of Women Shareholders in American Business. Among them were Ruth Bryan Owen (the former Congresswoman and daughter of William Jennings Bryan), Nellie Tayloe Ross (the former governor of Wyoming and the director of the U.S. Mint until 1953), and Georgia Neese Clark (the first woman Treasurer of the United States). In the early 1950s, the membership of the Federation was estimated at 1,500 men and women.

Soss’s feminist brand of shareholder activism inspired a Broadway play, The Solid Gold Cadillac, coauthored by the Pulitzer Prize–winning playwright George Kaufman. It began and ended with a shareholder’s meeting and centered on a character named Laura Partridge, modeled on Soss, who owned ten shares of stock in General Products Corporation of America. In the play’s opening moments, Partridge appears at the company’s annual meeting to challenge the high salaries of its top executives. The board adjourns the meeting and offers Partridge a high-paying executive position. She accepts and becomes the company’s first head of Stockholder Relations. The play’s final moments reveal that Partridge had charmed thousands of women shareholders to send her their proxies, effectively putting her in control of the firm. In 1956, Columbia Pictures released a movie version of The Solid Gold Cadillac, starring Judy Holliday, who resembled a young Wilma Soss; it was nominated for a Golden Globe. Though the movie marked a high point for the cultural recognition of women as shareholders, it ended with Partridge marrying an executive of the company and turned a story about women’s shareholding power into a happily-ever-after romance.

255. Pressure Group, NEW YORKER, June 25, 1949, at 15, 16. Soss asserted that her goal was not only to get women on corporate boards but “in executive and managerial positions” as well. Mouthpiece for Women! Organization Formed to Promote Interests of Feminine Shareholders in Industry, CIN. ENQUIRER, June 14, 1947, at 2-B.

256. Federation Leader Wants More Say for American Women in Business, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 18, 1950, at 14 (“Women have great economic power now through their shareholding in American industry, and men know it. The trouble is that women don’t know it and when they do find out, they are afraid to use their power. It’s time they did.”).

257. Logan, supra note 27, at 45.

258. Id.

259. The play was published as Howard Teichmann & George S. Kaufman, The Solid Gold Cadillac (1954). See Robert E. Wright & Janice Traflet, This Was the Real Life “Fearless Girl,” HIST. NEWS NETWORK (July 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/B6NS-CPLF (asserting that the movie was “loosely based on” Soss’s life).
F. Pro Rata Shareholding and the Feminization of Capital

Data published about women’s shareholding mainly disclosed the percentage of shareholders who were women, rather than the percentage of shares that women owned. Thus, unfortunately, we have only a partial picture of gender differences in pro rata shareholding before the middle of the century. From the data that exists, it seems likely that women never owned more stock than men across the market. Evidence indicates, however, that women did own more stock than men at some companies, for some periods of time.

Information about women’s share ownership is sparse but available for some companies. For example, a unique snapshot of sex-disaggregated holdings at the Pennsylvania Railroad exists for 1919, when monthly data was published. Over twelve months, the proportion of women stockholders at the Pennsylvania Railroad fell slightly while the percentage of shares held by women rose: At the end of the year, women owned 30.15% of stock. Some holdings data for General Motors was published in at least one major newspaper in the 1920s; in 1921, women were almost 22% of common stockholders at General Motors, but owned only 8.7% of common stock.

Studies of women’s pro rata stockholding before 1952 analyzed data for small, unrepresentative groups of companies. A study published in 1934 provided data for over twenty industrial and railroad companies. Women’s holdings ranged from 9.4% of shares at Walgreen Co. to 35% at Swift & Co.; overall, women owned 22.5% of shares. A 1948 survey of manufacturing corporations, which analyzed data for common stock holdings at eighteen companies that reported sex-disaggregated information, found that women

261. Id.; see also Atchison Stockholders, PIT. POST, Sept. 11, 1926, at 18 (finding that among 56,022 individual shareholders, 25,939 were men, owning 1,375,934 shares, and women numbered 30,083 but owned only 995,357 shares out of 3,565,823 shares of common and preferred stock combined).
262. The Journal’s reported percentages were incorrectly rounded down, suggesting that the publication sought to downplay the proportion of women shareholders. See General Motors Stockholders, supra note 149. Women’s shareholding in preferred stock was more significant—women were 45% of holders and owned 37.6% of preferred shares. Id.; see also American Smelting Control Rests with Smaller Owners: Four-Fifths the Stockholders Have Fifty Shares or Less and Have Ten Shares or Under, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1922, at 7 (showing that women held 20% of common and preferred shares, combined, at the American Smelting & Refining Co.).
263. See BRANCH, supra note 214, at 52-53.
264. See id. at 53.
collectively held 28% of the common stock of these companies, including both individual and joint holdings.265

The 1952 study prepared for the NYSE found that the average woman shareholder owned less stock than the average man, and that women, as a group, owned less stock than men as a group.266 The shareholding of General Mills in 1954 may have been typical of blue-chip public companies during that decade: More of General Mill’s stockholders were women than men, but men owned more shares of stock. Women’s share ownership constituted 20.9% of General Mills’s total, while men owned 26.9%—a difference of six percentage points.267

265. Who Owns ‘Big Business’? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part 1—Manufacturing, supra note 45, at 5, 7. The statistician Edwin Burk Cox reported that, between 1947 and 1957, men’s pro rata stockholding fell “about 20 per cent,” women’s pro rata stockholding dipped “slightly,” and joint stockholding increased (by an undisclosed proportion), so that the total percentage of individual stockholding (men, women, and joint accounts combined) was “only slightly smaller” in 1957 than it was in 1947. Cox, supra note 44, at 92-93. This trend suggests that married men were gradually holding less stock in their individual names, and more stock jointly with their wives. Cox’s results came from individual company data received from a maximum of eight companies having at least 50,000 shareholders of record. See id. at 72-73. Cox clearly possessed comparative data for the stock held by men and women at the companies he studied, but he did not disclose it. Nor did he present his data as representative of large companies overall. See id. at 73-74.

266. KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 75 (“For every four shares [of common stock of publicly owned companies] held or owned by men, a little less than three shares are held by women.”); id. at 76 (estimating the “average number of shares per shareholding in common stocks” for men was 167, while the average number for women was 121). From 1952 to 1965, the NYSE censuses provided some data on the relative stock holdings of women versus men, but the data cannot be usefully compared from one census to another because they covered different sets of companies and used different approaches. The 1952 NYSE study estimated that women stockholders of record owned 27% of common stocks, while men owned 36.7%. Id. at 76. Another 7.6% of total shares were held by joint accounts. Id. The 1956 census found that women stockholders owned 22.6% of common stock, while men stockholders owned 27.8%. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS?, supra note 29, at 27. Joint accounts owned another 7%. Id. In 1959, the NYSE census provided data for common and preferred issues combined and found a narrower gender gap: Women owned 19.7% of shares and men owned 22.7%. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, supra note 224, at 34. Joint accounts were 7.2% of total combined shares. Id. By the 1960s, many wealthy Americans were moving their equity investments into mutual funds. A 1966 study of corporate stock held directly by men and women who also invested in mutual funds found that for regular account holders, the market value of the median holding of men was nearly double the value of the median holding of women. See INV. CO. INST., THE MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDER: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY 46 (1966). The study also disaggregated gender for “accumulation plan holders,” which similarly showed a greater market value of the median holding of men compared to women. See id. at 47 (capitalization altered).

267. Charles B. Forbes, Bullis Sees Bright Future, MIA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1954, at 10-D (reporting that General Mills was owned by 9,963 shareholders, of whom 42.3% were
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At particularly large companies, however, women did sometimes own more stock than men. We know that, in 1948, women owned more AT&T stock than men because the company published this information in its annual report.268 At U.S. Steel, women were first reported to have outnumbered men as common-stock stockholders in 1950, and women's holdings of common stock were first reported to exceed the holdings of men in 1956.269 Women would continue to hold more common stock at U.S. Steel than men until at least 1978.270 Even at companies where they collectively held more stock, however, women struggled to translate their holdings into managerial power—a subject taken up in more detail below in Part II.E.

G. Race and the Feminization of Capital

Although many parties were tracking and publishing data about stockholders' gender, none made similar studies of stockholders' race.271 As a result, the evidentiary record on race and stockholding in the first half of the twentieth century is thin.272 However, we know two things: (1) that racial women, holding 20.9% of the stock, and that men represented 37.3% of stockholders, owning 26.9% of stock. Banks and firms (4.7% of stockholders) owned 36.6% of shares; trustees and guardians (31.2% of stockholders) owned 10.5% of stock. Id. This data underscores how blue-chip public companies, like General Mills, tended to have not only high proportions of women stockholders, but also significant share ownership by institutional investors. At these big companies, the story about shareholding started to shift in the 1950s from "women stockholders are taking over" to "institutional shareholders are taking over." See supra note 49; infra Part I.H.

268. AT&T 1948 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.

270. To obtain this data, I analyzed U.S. Steel's annual reports for the years 1956 to 1978. See, e.g., U.S. STEEL, 1956 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 271, at 21; U.S. STEEL, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1979). There is reason to suspect that women continuously held more common stock than men did even past 1978: U.S. Steel's annual report from that year contains figures that are nearly the inverse of those reported in 1977, and in 1979, women's shares again outnumbered those of men, suggesting a possible transcription error. See U.S. STEEL, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1978); U.S. STEEL, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1980).

271. Some of the earliest estimates of stockholders' race were published in the 1960s. See, e.g., 1/4-Million Negroes Own Stock Shares, PITT. COURIER, July 10, 1965, at 12.

272. At least one Black stock brokerage operated on Wall Street in the 1930s; by 1949, a member of the NYSE, Abraham and Company, had opened an office in Harlem. See JULIET E.K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS IN AMERICA: CAPITALISM, RACE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 259 (1998). A national organization of Black shareholders, the Negro and Allied Shareowners of America, was formed in 1964. See Shareholders' Unit Maps Rights Drive, ALA. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1964, at 3. Its founder, New Yorker John Silvera, asserted that Black Americans owned millions of shares of stock. Id. In 1965, a survey conducted by a Black-owned investment brokerage in Cleveland, Ohio, found that Black stockholders exceeded white stockholders.
discrimination and related disparities significantly reduced the financial resources of nonwhite Americans to invest in securities, especially in comparison to white Americans;\textsuperscript{273} and (2) that some nonwhite Americans \textit{did} own corporate stock during this period, including some Black women.\textsuperscript{274} Intersections of race- and sex-based discrimination would have made it particularly challenging for most nonwhite women to buy and hold stock.\textsuperscript{275} At AT&T, for example, where thousands of women stockholders obtained stock through programs designed to encourage employee stockholding, Black

\textsuperscript{273.} See, e.g., Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, \textit{Black–White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition}, 105 Q.J. ECON. 321, 332-134 (1990) (analyzing 1970s data and concluding that inheritance and ‘other intergenerational transfers by race’ are the largest factor influencing the racial wealth gap); Victor Perlo, \textit{Economics of Racism U.S.A.: Roots of Black Inequality} 52-53 (1975) (estimating that the median Black family income in 1945 was 55.3% of the income of the median white family); James D. Smith, \textit{White Wealth and Black People: The Distribution of Wealth in Washington, D.C., in 1967}, in \textit{The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth} 329, 350-51, 353 (James D. Smith ed., 1975) (suggesting that intergenerational transfers helped explain racial differences in wealth and noting that Black populations held a relatively small proportion of their wealth in stocks and bonds); see also Ramona Martin, \textit{One in Every Nine Montgomerians is a Stockholder; Investments Total Estimated $60-$100 Million Annually}, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 2, 1963, at 2 (“Despite the large Negro population in [the Montgomery, Alabama, area], the number of Negro stock customers here is minute.”); Angel Kwolek-Folland, \textit{The African American Financial Industries: Issues of Class, Race and Gender in the Early 20th Century}, BUS. & ECON. HIST., Winter 1994, at 85, 91 (“Until the 1920s, it is difficult to distinguish a separate black economic middle class.”).


\textsuperscript{275.} As Shennette Garrett-Scott has explained, “race and gender mutually reinforce each other as categories of exclusion and difference . . . in U.S. capitalism.” Garrett-Scott, \textit{supra} note 237, at 4.
women were not hired as telephone operators until the 1950s. Racial discrimination in employment shaped the racial makeup of shareholders and thus the racial makeup of corporate organization.

This Article argues that shareholder identity influenced corporate theory and business leaders’ views about the appropriate role of shareholders in corporate organization. A shareholder’s gender was often discernible from the stockholders’ list; although not as likely, race may also have been discernible for some shareholders. There is no reason to think that shareholders’ racial identities did not also influence business leaders’ views about shareholder governance, to the extent that they were known to business leaders. Further study of the race of shareholders during this period would shed light on the racialized expression of power through corporate law.

H. The End of the Feminization of Capital

By the 1960s, the major story in business was the growing power of institutional investors. One contemporaneous expert suggested that the

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276. For a discussion of women and employee shareholding in AT&T, see note 14 and the accompanying text above. See also Perlo, supra note 275, at 133-34 (noting that AT&T “followed a deliberate and open policy of whites only” for most of its history).

277. Names and personal titles or honorifics may have given clues about a stockholder’s race, ethnicity, or religion.

278. See “Freeze Out” Charged Against Big Oil Co., supra note 104 (describing an early-twentieth-century lawsuit alleging that the officers and directors of one California corporation sought to exclude Asian shareholders). The race of some stockholders might have been known to corporate managers. For instance, big corporations commonly sold stock to their own employees, and we can assume that companies had racial information about their own employees.


“emphasis which has been placed on the growing importance of institutional investors” seemed out of step with the data, which showed a rather small increase in institutional shareholding through 1957. But while this expert challenged the institutional-investor narrative, he too ignored the rise of women shareholders, studying only stockholders’ income, age, and occupation—not their gender. It remains unclear why academics who wrote about shareholders during the 1950s and 1960s mostly ignored the rise of women shareholders, even as the proportion of women shareholders, and of women’s shareholdings at some companies, reached a zenith.

Institutional investing became an early interest among scholars and has held their attention ever since. The gendered effect of intermediation has received less attention. As American women shifted their equity investments into funds, as did their male counterparts, voting control over their shares became exercisable by fund managers, who were almost exclusively male. Pension funds, which increased in number after 1950, invested increasing proportions of their growing assets in corporate stock. Though many of their beneficiaries were women, the managers of pension funds were men.

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281. Cox, supra note 44, at 2. Cox, a statistician at Boston University, wrote:

Between 1949 and 1957 the holdings of institutional investors, including insurance companies, investment companies, non-profit institutions, non-insured pension funds, and mutual savings banks, increased from 12.4 per cent to 15.3 per cent of the value of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This eight-year period was one of extremely rapid growth for the institutions most often credited with increasing the relative importance of institutional investments, investment companies and pension funds. Yet the relative importance of institutional ownership rose less than three percentage points.

Id.


283. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1355 (1992) (“Investments in common stock by state and local pension systems ballooned from $10.1 billion in 1970 to $150.2 billion in 1986 and to an estimated $240 billion” in 1990.”); PAUL P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 7 (1959) (observing that “the most rapid period of growth” in pension funds occurred from 1951 to 1954 when, according to an SEC survey, “the number of corporations with self-administered plans rose by about one-third”).

Although the rise of institutional investing has never before been understood as a realignment of power along gender lines, it was exactly that. In addition to restoring voting control over women’s stock to men, the rise of institutional investing caused the feminization of capital to recede from public consciousness and, eventually, from memory. For a short time, women comprised a majority of American public-company stockholders, if not the holders of a majority of public-company stock.285 With the rise of intermediation—what one SEC official called the “deretailization” of the stock market286—women were returned to minority status among stockholders. Indeed, when the NYSE conducted a stockholder census in 1980, it found that the gender of the stockholder class had reverted to majority male, albeit by a small margin.287

The corporate law literature has extensively documented the rise of institutional investing and the reconcentration of stockholding in a small number of institutional holders.288 According to some estimates, institutional investors own about 80% of the outstanding stock at U.S. public companies.289 Although the corporate law literature has spilled much ink exploring the

285. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (describing the 1950s and 1960s NYSE stockholder censuses that establish this finding).


power and control implications of the “institutionalization” of capital, it has never described or explored the rise of women’s stockholding in the twentieth century, nor has it acknowledged that this reconcentration had a gendered effect.

The rise of institutional investing also obscured the gender of stockholding, which helped to erase the feminization of capital from memory. When individuals hold stock through an intermediary, the stockholder list no longer identifies the beneficial holder of stock, making that person’s gender unknowable. Institutional investors were not male or female, so their growing significance tended to make questions of stockholder gender obsolete. Overall, the rising importance (and voting power) of institutional investors marginalized human investors, regardless of gender. When Berle and Means’s blameworthy, passive shareholder was reworked through the lens of law and economics—to emerge, in the 1970s and 1980s, as the rationally passive shareholder—its gendered origin had been lost. Until now, these gendered aspects of corporate history have been hiding in plain sight.

II. Implications of the Feminization of Capital

Part I synthesized evidence from various sources to produce a new history foregrounding women’s role as shareholders in the development of modern corporate capitalism. The evidence establishes that women entered the twentieth century as a minority of equity investors but became the majority of individual shareholders, first at leading public companies like AT&T and then,

290. See Langevoort, supra note 288 (describing institutionalization as “a shift toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, bank trust departments, and the like” in “[t]he last thirty years or so”).

291. For example, one of the largest institutional investors in the United States, the California State Teachers Retirement Fund System (CalSTRS), invests the retirement savings of nearly one million public school teachers in California, 70% of whom are women. Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1983 (2020) (identifying CalSTRS as one of “the three largest U.S. public pension funds”); CalSTRS at a Glance, CALSTRS, https://perma.cc/G49K-L67Y (archived Feb. 8, 2022) (noting that CalSTRS has 975,000 members and beneficiaries); CAL. STATE TCHRS.' RET. SYS., CALSTRS DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY SURVEY FACT SHEET 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/D6YT-J79U (noting that 70% of CalSTRS members are women). In 2018, however, only 36% of CalSTRS nonadministrative investment staff was female. See CALSTRS, DIVERSITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF INVESTMENTS: 2019 ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 11, https://perma.cc/LFM7-L67K (archived Feb. 8, 2022). For a rare mention of the gendered impacts of institutional investing, see Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 363-64 (2017) (noting that institutional shareholders represent “diverse constituencies” and drawing on the example of CalSTRS to show that women-dominated institutional investors may demand increased representation of women on corporate boards).
around mid-century, across the equity capital market. Women’s “invasion” of shareholding became a subplot in newspaper coverage of corporate America. Leading business thinkers of their eras, including Louis Brandeis, Owen Young, William Ripley, Alfred Sloan, Jr., and J.A. Livingston, considered the growing proportion of women shareholders relevant to their broader views on the American corporation. Yet the twentieth century’s most influential monograph on corporate theory, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, omitted any mention of women. In part due to this important omission—and in part because the feminization of capital ceased to be discernible during the rise of institutional investors—the corporate law discipline has never treated gender as relevant to the evolution of its important ideas. Yet, as any corporate law expert knows, corporate law’s foundational ideas were forged during the first half of the twentieth century—the era of the feminization of capital.

This Part contextualizes the new history provided in Part I within some of the foundational ideas in corporate law, exploring how the reality of women’s significant shareholding—and early-twentieth-century views about women and gender difference—might have played a role in shaping them. The five Subparts that follow are more of a survey than a deep examination; in a single article, it is not possible to explore every idea from every angle. This Part examines the “separate spheres” of corporate governance (the separation of ownership and control), the idea that shareholders are naturally “passive,” stakeholderism, the idea of the “average” or “reasonable” investor in corporate law, and women’s role in corporate control. It sketches the contours of a twenty-first-century research agenda at the intersection of history, gender, and corporate law. That research agenda points us toward a more accurate view of our past and a long-overdue perspective on power as expressed by corporate law.

A. Gender and the Separation of Ownership and Control

One of the central problems in corporate law is the “separation of ownership and control,” an idea commonly credited to *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*.

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292. See supra Parts I.A, I.E.
293. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 74-80.
294. See supra Part I.D.
295. See John C. Coffee, Jr., *The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control*, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (identifying the ‘Path Dependency Thesis’ and summarizing it as the view that ‘history matters, because it constrains the way in which institutions can change’).
Berle and Means used the separation metaphor to argue that the "old property relationships" of the corporation were broken and the "atom" of private property was splitting into two opposing camps. In the organizational structure of the large corporation, Berle and Means observed the "surrender and regrouping of the incidence of ownership" itself. Corporate ownership was dissolving into "its component parts, control and beneficial ownership." One group of persons represented "control," while a different group of persons represented "ownership."

The separation of ownership and control has been called the "foundational instability of American corporate governance." This concept's widespread acceptance in the fields of law and economics gave rise to agency-cost theory, which views agency problems arising between "strong" managers and "weak" owners as the main inefficiency of corporate organization. In the 1980s, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen recharacterized the paradigm as the "separation of decision and risk-bearing functions" in which agency problems arose between "decision agents" and "residual claimants." Both scholars who subscribe to Berle and Means's formulation and those preferring Fama and

296. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Corporate Law and Business Theory, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2017) ("Great numbers of articles in academic corporate law take 'the separation of ownership and control' famously identified by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means as a central starting point for analysis."). For an overview of the influence of The Modern Corporation on the intellectual development of corporate law, see generally Bratton, supra note 206 (exploring the "endurance" of ideas articulated in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, especially the separation of ownership and control).

297. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 2, 8 (describing the "dissolution of the atom of property").

298. Id. at 8.

299. Id. (noting that corporate ownership had previously "bracketed full power of manual disposition with complete right to enjoy the use, the fruits, and the proceeds of physical assets").


301. See, e.g., Fichtner et al., supra note 38, at 301 (describing how Berle and Means's work "led to the recognition of the principal–agent problem that underlies modern corporate governance theory"); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 282, at 870; see also Roe, supra note 39, at 5-6 (employing the strong managers–weak owners framework).

302. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 310, 312 (1983) (concluding that this paradigm is "the problem of separation of ownership and control that has long troubled students of corporations").
Jensen’s contractarian approach have presented the reduction of agency costs as the core purpose of corporate law.303

Berle and Means did not introduce the separation premise to corporate governance.304 In fact, business thinkers had been discussing the relationship of corporate ownership to control for decades before Berle and Means published their book.305 In 1904, for example, Talcott Williams wrote about the “diffusion of ownership” in corporations and observed that “[c]ontrol and ownership are no longer wedded.”306 Metaphors about the “marriage” and “divorce” of ownership and control, like the one deployed by Williams, analogized corporate control to spousal relationships.307 Nearly thirty years after Williams wrote that control and ownership were decoupling, Berle and

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303. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1920 (1996) (arguing that corporate law “is generally understood to have a largely economic function . . . [that] might be characterized as . . . minimizing the sum of the transaction and agency costs of contracting through the corporate form”); Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 BUS. L. 775, 896 (2007) (describing the influence of transaction-cost economics on corporate law in connection with “Berle and Means’ famous treatise” and noting that “[t]he role of corporate law is to effect a system of organization which will decrease agency costs overall, but to do so without creating new agency costs”).

304. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 302, at 1255 (“It is around 1900 that we first find stirring the popular idea that ownership and control were separating in the modern corporation.”); Wells, supra note 136, at 588; McCraw, supra note 177, at 578-79. Indeed, Jerome Frank alluded to this idea in his 1933 review of the book. Jerome Frank, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 989, 990 (1933).

305. Some have traced the origin of the separation of ownership and control to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 373, 374 (2009); Wells, supra note 302, at 1251 (“In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identified divergent interest between managers and owners as an, in his eyes, insuperable dilemma for the efficient operation of the corporation.”); DAVID FINN, THE CORPORATE OLIGARCH 13-14 (1969). Alexander Bryan Johnson, a wealthy banker from Utica, New York, was another early thinker who identified the “natural antagonism between the interest of a corporation and the interests of its managers,” as “the most inveterate danger that attends corporations.” Johnson, supra note 65, at 629. Neither Smith nor Johnson used a separation metaphor to describe the problem they observed, however.

306. Talcott Williams, The Corporation, in ORGANIZED LABOR AND CAPITAL: THE WILLIAM L. BULL LECTURES FOR THE YEAR 1904, at 67, 118, 122-23 (1904). For other early examples, see Kavanagh v. Kavanagh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 151 (N.Y. 1919); and Seligman, supra note 167, at 442 (“The salient characteristic of the corporate form of conducting business is the separation of control from the other attributes of ownership.”).


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Means reinvigorated the idea by using empirical data to show how corporate control was concentrating in a small number of hands. Importantly, Berle and Means also popularized the notion that control and ownership were separating because “passive” shareholders were “surrendering” control over the firm, ascribing a moral valence to the changes they observed.308

Although the separation premise has been widely accepted in corporate law as a conceptual framework for understanding corporate organization, Berle and Means had critics.309 From the book’s publication to the present, scholars have asserted that no bona fide “separation” or bright line ever emerged between those who controlled big companies and those who owned stock in them.310 To the contrary, critics argued, stockholders and controllers were overlapping groups. Marxist economists in particular rejected the separation premise. For example, Paul Sweezy argued that “what actually happens” is that “the great majority of owners is stripped of control in favor of a small minority of owners.”311 Other critics have broadly challenged corporate law’s myopic focus on the “shareholder–management nexus.”312

The ownership-and-control separation framework itself resembles the “separate spheres” of gender difference that would have been familiar to all Americans of Berle and Means’s era, dividing nearly all aspects of life into

308. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 355; id. at 355-56 (noting that the control groups “have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society”).

309. See, e.g., Cheffins & Bank, supra note 37, at 466 (discussing “considerable criticism” of Berle and Means’s separation premise). A year after winning the Nobel Prize in economics, George Stigler coauthored a critique of The Modern Corporation and its separation premise with Claire Friedland. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J. L. & ECON. 237, 237 (1983). Stigler and Friedland argued that “[t]he majority of the voting stock is the ultimate control over a corporation even if that stock is diffused among many owners . . . . [I]n an ultimate sense ownership and control cannot be separated.” Id. at 248. They also concluded that the data showed “no clear evidence that the management-dominated corporations differed much from owner-dominated companies” in the ways suggested by Berle and Means’s separation premise. Id. at 259.

310. See, e.g., Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1520 n.52 (2006). A few years after The Modern Corporation was published, the Temporary National Economic Committee conducted a major study of the concentration of economic power at American public companies and concluded (contrary to Berle and Means’s findings) that “[i]n the average corporation the majority of the voting power is concentrated in the hands of not much over 1 percent of the stockholders.” TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., supra note 41, at xvii.


312. Margaret M. Blair, Rethinking Assumptions Behind Corporate Governance, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 12, 17 (“[C]orporate governance discussions that . . . focus only on the power relationship between shareholders and managers have the emphasis wrong.”).
“public” (for men) and “private” (for women). \(^{313}\) Separate-spheres ideology imagines a bilateral division of things into masculine versus feminine: strong versus weak, active versus passive, rational versus emotional, and so on. \(^{314}\) In 1872, Justice Joseph Bradley of the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the separate-spheres ideology in a concurrence affirming the view of the Illinois Supreme Court that it was an “axiomatic truth” that “God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action.” \(^{315}\) As presented by Berle and Means, the separation of ownership and control reimagined corporate governance as similarly divided. On one hand were the “active” male managers who ran the business. On the other were “passive” shareholders who served little purpose other than to collect dividend checks, and who included large numbers of women. Later in his career as a corporate law professor, Berle switched to using the term “passive receptive” to describe the function of shareholding. \(^{316}\) Writing the year after the NYSE published its first survey results establishing that most

\(^{313}\) See Evans, supra note 158, at 183 (describing the corporate office of the 1920s as “a public environment in which males and females were accorded separate and unequal roles analogous to their traditional roles in the home”); O’Connor, supra note 108, at 658 (“The notion of gender-specific spheres had its roots in the belief that women were subordinate to men by nature, almost certainly less intelligent, and biologically less suited to the rigors of business and politics. Even at the turn of the century, the law still firmly enshrined the separate-spheres theory of gender relationships.”); Henry Clews, Woman in Politics, Nature, History, Business and the Home, in Financial, Economic, and Miscellaneous Speeches and Essays 315, 315 (1910) (asserting that “man and woman were created to perform separate and distinct functions in life” and criticizing women for participating in business and politics). Clews, the founder of a New York brokerage firm, was one of the oldest and most venerated members of the NYSE. The Great Banking House of Henry Clews & Co.: Its Magnitude and Success, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1886, at 4 (describing the firm as “honorable and deservedly prosperous” and tracing its origin to 1877). Charles O’Kelley has suggested that our understanding of corporate theorists like Berle is obscured by our “general lack of historical knowledge” about the milieu in which they wrote. Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1141, 1171 (2010). Though most Americans would recoil from the “separate-spheres” ideology today, there is no question that it was a dominant societal framework during the lives of Berle and Means.

\(^{314}\) As one writer put it: “In all things since the beginning of time there will be found the two principles, the one primary, the other secondary; the one active, the other passive, the ‘pair of opposites’ that manifest as sun and moon, day and night, fire and water, energy and substance, man and woman, and so forth; man the active principle, woman the passive principle.” Elizabeth E. Goldsmith, Suffrage Unnatural, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1915, at 1.

\(^{315}\) Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 132 (1872) (statement of the case); see id. at 139, 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).

individual American shareholders were women, Berle asserted that the “‘passive receptive’ side of the corporation” was “functionless.”

After the publication of *The Modern Corporation*, the political theorist James Burnham made a direct connection between the separation premise and the gender of shareholding. In an influential 1941 book, *The Managerial Revolution*, Burnham claimed that the rise of women’s stock ownership suggested that capitalists were withdrawing from “active and direct participation of any sort in the economic process.” Burnham’s claim echoed Berle and Means’s suggestion that shareholder passivity involved the choice to “surrender” control. Women’s stock ownership underscored a growing “gap” between the “legal owners” of business (shareholders) and the “instruments of production,” Burnham wrote, because “whatever the biological merits, it is a fact that women do not play a serious leading role in the actual economic process.”

The separation premise helped justify the shift in corporate power away from common stock, owned by an ever-expanding group of women, to male managers. From 1890 to 1930, a number of leading corporate theorists had argued that empowering shareholders was the key to reforming corporate governance and resolving the “corporation problem.” At the beginning of his career, Berle himself had advocated for strategies that would have

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317. Berle, supra note 318, at 7; N.Y. Stock Exch., Who Owns American Business?, supra note 29, at 6 (finding that in 1956, women were 51.6% of individual stockholders). Later generations of corporate law scholars did not agree that ‘passive’ shareholders were functionless. Rather, a generation of law-and-economics scholars characterized shareholders as residual claimants who played an important risk-bearing function within a firm structure characterized by specialization. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 231, 231-32 (2008); Fama & Jensen, supra note 304, at 308. Mark Roe summarized it this way: “The distinctive governance structure of the large American firm . . . is usually seen as a natural economic outcome arising from specialization: shareholders would specialize in risk-bearing but wanted diversification, and firms needed specialized, professional management.” Roe, supra note 39, at ix.


319. Berle & Means, supra note 35, at 338 (“The stockholder has surrendered control over his wealth.”).

320. Burnham, supra note 320, at 101. Burnham minimized women’s stockholding as instrumental, asserting (without evidence) that the registration of stock in women’s names was “often a legal device to aid in the preservation of wealth.” Id.

empowered shareholders to act collectively to curb managerial power. By the time he published *The Modern Corporation* with Means, however, Berle had changed his view. In that book, Berle and Means asserted that, for companies with liquid stock, the stock market—and not shareholders—would discipline corporate management. Management expert Walter Werner argued that Berle and Means's book made "a radical departure from earlier views" by suggesting that "shareholders' rights in the market were integral to their rights in the corporation," thus making the stock market "the key to shareholder protection." Here we see the genesis of the New Deal securities laws, enacted only a few years later, which made market regulation and corporate disclosure—instead of shareholder empowerment—the key to reforming big business. The market, of course, was introduced as an apolitical—even egalitarian—mechanism to discipline managers, while simultaneously rendering the human identity of individual stockholders invisible and making shareholders' changing gender irrelevant.

In the 1990s, Mark Roe offered a new, political explanation for America's unique corporate structure, which was grounded in the history of this period. In his retelling, American law and politics "fragmented"

322. See, e.g., Bratton, *supra* note 206, at 751-52 (outlining Berle's early work, including his suggestion that trust companies gather "many small holdings into an institution commanding a block so large that [shareholder] protection was feasible" (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 39 (1928))); Richard S. Kirkendall, *A.A. Berle, Jr.: Student of the Corporation, 1917-1932*, 35 BUS. HIST. REV. 43, 48 (1961) ("At the age of twenty-six, [Berle's] mind had wandered to thoughts of changing the location of power in industry."); RIPLEY, *supra* note 57, at 133 (describing Berle as having proposed reforming corporate governance by creating committees "representative exclusively of shareholders' interests").

323. See Bratton, *supra* note 206, at 752-53 (describing how Berle's "attitude toward regulation" changed through his collaboration with Means, and how Berle "abandon[ed] a self-regulatory approach in favor of government control of corporate activity").

324. BERLE & MEANS, *supra* note 35, at 287 ("Economically, the various so-called 'legal rights' or the economic pressures which may lead a management to do well by its stockholders, in and of themselves are merely uncertain expectations in the hands of the individual. Aggregated, interpreted by a public market, and appraised in a security exchange, they do have a concrete and measurable value; and it is to this value that the shareholder must and in fact does address himself.").


326. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell has argued that, in the 1920s, corporate law scholars like Berle and Ripley chose "the goal of protecting shareholders" over "trusting shareholders as active agents." See Mitchell, *supra* note 312, at 1511 ("The first attempt to give meaningful voice to shareholders ended with protection but not empowerment."). Later, "[t]he securities acts of 1933 and 1934 did not try to empower or protect shareholders. Their goal was to reinforce the ideal of a healthy free market." Id. at 1512.

intermediaries such as banks, insurers, and mutual funds, preventing them from accumulating large blocks of stock and exercising control in firms.\textsuperscript{328} Roe argued that Americans made these political choices in part because they mistrusted private accumulations of power, and he argued that these political choices helped explain why American corporations ended up with large numbers of dispersed stockholders.\textsuperscript{329} Roe’s work was pathbreaking for its acknowledgment that political choices influenced the evolution of American corporate structures. His ideas contravened then-popular “natural selection” theories that presented corporate structure as the product of naturally occurring “organizational adaptation” to economic pressures.\textsuperscript{330} Roe’s book, \textit{Strong Managers, Weak Owners}, assumed the separation premise and did not explore individual shareholders’ identities as relevant to the political story. Lacking a historical narrative recognizing women as an important subgroup of shareholders, Roe provided only a partial explanation for how “politics created the fragmented Berle–Means corporation.”\textsuperscript{331}

Gender politics plausibly operated as another factor contributing to the emergence of the atomized Berle–Means corporation. Part I of this Article demonstrated how the dispersion of shareholding in the early decades of the twentieth century was driven, at least in part, by demand for corporate stock among women. The political and legal status of women at the time helps explain this process. For example, although women were excluded from political citizenship until 1920, even married women were embraced as voting corporate “citizens” by the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, to the extent that women wished to participate in public-sphere decisionmaking on an equal footing with men, shareholding offered that opportunity. Indeed, evidence suggests that some women actively participated in shareholder governance at big companies before 1920, at a time when they would have been excluded from participation in other forms of organizational governance dominated by men, and after 1920, when women’s expanded role in public life remained controversial.\textsuperscript{332} In addition, women’s wages were discounted for their gender,\textsuperscript{333} while their return on a share of stock was not. This might have encouraged women, especially wage-earning women, to view shareholding as a uniquely attractive form of economic activity. Finally, some married women’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{328} Id. at 26.
\item \textsuperscript{329} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{330} Id. at 285-87.
\item \textsuperscript{331} Id. at 287. Quite reasonably, Roe did not claim that his analysis fully explained the rise of the Berle–Means corporation.
\item \textsuperscript{332} See infra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{333} See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 234, at 11-12 (“The economic results of occupational segregation for women are low wages.”).
\end{itemize}
property laws, enacted in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, empowered married women to hold and vote stock held in their names and might have encouraged women and their families to channel women’s wealth into shareholding.334

When combined, all of these factors present a story that is complementary to the one described by Roe. While American law and politics were evolving to prevent institutional investors from accumulating block-holding power, they were also developing in ways that made shareholding a particularly attractive investment for generations of American women. And corporate managers might have viewed small shareholdings by women investors as a politically desirable basis for fighting back against anti-corporate public sentiment.335 The result was a trend in which the shareholder class not only grew, but also feminized.

The changing identity of American shareholders infused gender politics into questions of corporate structure—especially the separation of ownership and control. It encouraged business leaders to perceive a conceptual “separation” in corporate structure that reified two elements—owners and managers—who were, in fact, divided by gender. Owners included women, but managers were exclusively male.

In addition, the changing identity of the shareholder class also likely shaped business leaders’ views about the best way to curb managerial power—one of the leading issues of the day. Stereotypes about women’s lack of aptitude for business, emotional decisionmaking, and submissive personalities contributed to a trend in which business leaders gradually changed their thinking about shareholder governance of big companies.336 By the mid-1930s,
few corporate law scholars were arguing in favor of shareholder collective action. Rather, the neutral mechanism of the stock market, regulated through New Deal securities laws, was gaining favor as a means of disciplining managers. Now, in the twenty-first century, the “mythical battle” between owners and managers has come under increasing criticism in the corporate law academy, suggesting that it may be time to reevaluate the separation premise, its origin, and its continuing value to corporate law and theory.

 purchase programs and gave bonuses in stock. Thus, demographic changes in stockholding from 1900 to 1960 brought not only women into shareholding but also a growing chorus of labor voices. See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Interests and Corporate Power, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1123 (2019) (discussing the relationship of labor to corporate organization and power).

Among the last to do so was William Douglas, who, three years before he became chair of the SEC, argued that “some method must be devised to mobilize scattered and disorganized stockholders and other investors into an active and powerful group so that there may be a competent and respectable patrol of the field of finance.” William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1934); see also Alden Whitman, William O. Douglas Is Dead at 81; Served 36 Years on Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1980, at 1 (providing an overview of Douglas’s life and work).

Another idea that gained traction was the “independent director.” Some Progressive Era corporate law experts had proposed that the government select directors to manage railroad corporations in the public interest. See, e.g., William W. Cook, Industrial Democracy or Monopoly? How American Railways Can Be Taken Over for the People Safely and Easily, 38 McClure’s Mag. 352, 355 (1912). This idea was revived by law professor I. Maurice Wormser in 1931. See I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED 139 (1931). A few years later, William Douglas advocated independent directors in an important article in the Harvard Law Review. See Douglas, supra note 339, at 1322 (“[W]e begin and end with the assumption that the directors are trustees by virtue of business ethics as well as law; and that the powers which they exercise are powers in trust.”); see also William O. Douglas, Comm’r, SEC, Address Before the Bond Club of New York: Democracy in Industry and Finance 12 (Mar. 24, 1937) (on file with author) (discussing how to encourage “directors who will represent the public interest” and proposing as possible solutions “the principle of rotation of directors and the creation of so-called public directors”). The Investment Company Act of 1940 imposed a requirement of independent directors on investment companies; that same year, the SEC recommended that board audit committees have nonmanagement directors. See Roberta S. Karmel, Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 538, 545 (1984) (describing some of these developments); McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2707, [Accounting Series Release Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940) (recommending independent audit committees).

See, e.g., J.B. Heaton, Corporate Governance and the Cult of Agency, 64 VILL. L. REV. 201, 202 (2019) (describing the separation as a “mythical battle” and arguing for an end to the “cult of agency”).
B. The Pathology of “Passivity”

Central to Berle and Means’s separation theory was the idea that shareholders were becoming “passive.”340 The cause of this change, they wrote, was the dispersion of stock ownership.341 The inability to pressure or control management, due to the small size of a holder’s stock, was presented as the condition of passivity. Thus, while the word “passive” might suggest to the modern reader that the holder was choosing to do nothing, Berle and Means used it to characterize dispersed shareholding itself.342 In their depiction, ownership of a small amount of widely held stock was “passive” virtually by definition, and this passivity was the reason that shareholders were losing power in firms while corporate managers were gaining it.343

When Berle and Means used the word “passive” to describe dispersed shareholders, they were not reiterating a common characterization of the 1920s and 1930s.344 Berle and Means were among the first scholars to present dispersed shareholding in the academic literature as inherently passive. In doing so, they were also reviving an old trope about women as inactive shareholders.345 In 1907, for example, the Cincinnati Enquirer reported that

340. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 66 (“Most fundamental of all, the position of [stock] ownership has changed from that of an active to that of a passive agent.”); see also id. at 346-47 (“Passive property . . . gives its possessors an interest in an enterprise but gives them practically no control over it, and involves no responsibility . . . . [It consists] of a set of relationships between an individual and an enterprise, involving rights of the individual toward the enterprise but almost no effective powers over it.”).

341. Id. at 84 (“When the largest single interest amounts to but a fraction of one per cent . . . no stockholder is in the position through his holdings alone to place important pressure upon the management or to use his holdings as a considerable nucleus for the accumulation of the majority of votes necessary to control.”).


343. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 338 (“The stockholder has surrendered control over his wealth. He has become a supplier of capital, a risk-taker pure and simple, while ultimate responsibility and authority are exercised by directors and ‘control.’”). Years later, Berle expanded upon his views on “the American passive-property system” in a solo-authored book. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 36-59 (1963). He opined that the “price” of the wide distribution of “passive property” was “intolerable loss of individual liberty and individual capacity for self-realization.” Id. at 55. Another group of scholars has suggested that the Berle–Means corporation “created relationships of economic and political dependency” for stock owners. ALLEN KAUFMAN, LAWRENCE ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (1995).

344. In fact, in finance, the word “passive” had traditionally been used to mean a bond or debt upon which no interest was paid. Passive, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).

345. The idea of the “passive” stockholder had appeared sporadically in various writings before The Modern Corporation was published. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nicomen Boom Co. v. Nicom
bankers in the city had a “tough problem”: Too much stock was in “passive hands.”346 The article described Cincinnati bankers “perusing the lists of stockholders” only to discover that some banks were “‘waterlogged’ with a class of stockholders” who wished only to collect dividends and “take no active interest in” the bank.347 In one bank, which had about 300 stockholders, it was found that women constitute nearly half of the stockholders. The division was made into resident and nonresident women, resident active business men, nonresident men, retired resident men, estates, other banks (competitors) and corporations. The showing proved that the holdings of the active stockholders were relatively very small compared with the holdings of the passive stockholders. There is hardly a bank in the city but that has a large number of women and estates holding stock.348

The passage suggested that men stockholders could be “active” in business, but women were always “passive,” and that business leaders ascribed meaning to the difference. It underscored how passivity was not only associated with women, but also characterized as a bad quality for shareholders, and ultimately bad for business.349

The influence of their mentor and former professor at Harvard, William Ripley, was evident in Berle and Means’s construction of the passive shareholder.350 In his 1927 book *Main Street and Wall Street*, Ripley had contrasted shareholder voting by proxy with shareholders’ “passive participation in management” and lamented how “the wide distribution of stock to employees and the consumers of the corporation’s product”—

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347. *Id.*  
348. *Id.*  
349. Indeed, the “passive” quality of stockholding is often gratuitously characterized in negative terms. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, *The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer*, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1171 n.27 (1981) (arguing that “shareholders’ self-interest has led them to be ignorant and passive”).  
350. At least one reviewer characterized Berle and Means’s book as an extension of Ripley’s work. See Robert S. Stevens, *Book Review*, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 634, 634 (1933) (describing *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* as “fundamentally a further, more detailed and up-to-date study, based upon collected data, of [the] same problem” explored by Ripley in a previous work, and noting that Berle and Means acknowledged “their indebtedness” to Ripley).
possible reference to women—"accentuate[d]"—the "nullification" of the "ordinary shareholder." In the same book, Ripley openly disparaged women shareholders, judging them "ill-fitted by training—begging the moot point of sex—to govern" businesses "directly." Berle and Means did not express the same open contempt for women shareholders, but they described small shareholders as irresponsible and contrasted the modern, widely held corporation with an earlier version of corporate capitalism in which "[t]he number of shareholders was few; they could and did attend meetings; they were business-men; their vote meant something."

Of course, contemporaneous readers probably understood the use of the word "passive" to mean "feminine." At the time, passivity was closely associated with stereotypes about women, often offered in contradistinction to the "active" character of men. "To be passive is woman's great force," one speaker argued in an address published in the Washington Post in 1922. As late as 1989, the Oxford English Dictionary expressly defined "passive" as, among other definitions, "[o]f, relating to or characteristic of the female . . . role." Throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, the idea that

footnote continued on next page
women were naturally passive played an important role in defining the types of paying work available to women and the career paths they could pursue.358

It is certainly true that in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, shareholders of major companies often did not attend annual meetings, submit their proxies, or otherwise participate in shareholder governance. Before Berle and Means, this was commonly described as absentee shareholding, and it was attributed to corporate laws and practices, such as the in-person shareholder meeting and the proxy system, that made shareholder participation exceedingly difficult.359 Berle and Means conflated the rising tide of “passive” shareholders (i.e., women) with the governance problem of absentee shareholding.

At any rate, there are many reasons to doubt that small shareholders had made a choice not to participate in corporate governance. Evidence from the period indicates that small shareholders tried to participate. When only a single person—a woman shareholder—showed up for the 1913 annual meeting of the U.S. Reduction and Refining Company, the Wall Street Journal published a short article that described her searching for a meeting that the company’s own officers and directors did not hold.360 As shareholding expanded over the decades that followed, attendance at shareholder meetings climbed. Shareholders of AT&T were being turned away at the door for a lack of space

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358. As one historian put it, “Gender analysis has exposed the processes that naturalized women’s positions on the lower rungs and men’s domination of the upper rungs of [workplace] hierarchies.” Mandell, supra note 357, at 501-02.

359. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices—The Competition That Kills, HARPER'S WKLY., Nov. 15, 1918, at 10, 12 (describing “the huge corporation with its myriad of employees, its absentee ownership, and its financier control,” as presenting “a grave danger to our democracy”); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 4 (1923); SEARS, supra note 58, at 216 (noting “[t]he absentee and apathetic attitude of the typical stockholder”); id. at 8 (quoting a social scientist, Henry Ward, using the phrase); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006) (attributing shareholder “passivity” in part to “background legal rules that often make it difficult for shareholders to intervene”). Even in his epic dissent in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, in which he repeatedly cited and endorsed Berle and Means’s ideas about the separation of ownership and control, Justice Brandeis continued to avoid the language of “passivity.” See 288 U.S. 517, 568-69 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (retaining the term “absentee ownership”); see also Douglas, supra note 339, at 1317 (using “absentee ownership” but not “passive ownership”).

as early as 1945, for example. Meetings also grew in length, as more shareholders sought to participate actively in debate. In 1952, a Wall Street Journal reporter interviewing three random shareholders who had turned up for the Standard Oil Indiana annual meeting spoke with a woman who had driven 350 miles to attend. In 1961, twenty thousand shareholders showed up to AT&T’s annual shareholder meeting in Chicago—more than the number of attendees at the opening of baseball season. Many similar stories suggest that, especially after the Great Depression, shareholders were trying to figure out how to participate in the governance of big companies, but no clear method presented itself.

361. See Labor Group’s Plans Lose at A.T.&T. Meet, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1945, at 14 (describing how “[about 50 to 100] stockholders “were unable to enter the AT&T’s assembly room—so great was the crush”). AT&T, whose meetings had involved as few as 700 stockholders in 1949, was sending hundreds of stockholders into overflow rooms to watch the televised proceedings by 1953. For Whom the Bell Tolls, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps., Newark, N.J.), May 1949, at 1, 1; A.T.&T. Holders View Annual Meeting on TV, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1953, at 20. Reports of attendance in 1953 ranged from 1,200 to more than 1,800. Compare A.T.&T. Holders View Annual Meeting on TV, supra, with Wish You Were Here, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps., Newark, N.J.), May 1953, at 1, 1, 3. International Telephone & Telegraph held its 1953 annual meeting in circus tents in Nutley, New Jersey. I.T.&T. Takes Annual Meeting to Stockholders, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1955, at 9. That same year, American Airlines held its annual meeting in a hangar at LaGuardia Field; it was attended by 1,800 shareholders. The Stockholder’s Voice, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1953, at 4. “Each year we get more and more stockholders at the annual meeting,” said an executive of General Electric in 1954. Doyle F. Smee, Mr. Stockholder: Encouraged by Industry, He Plays a Bigger Part at Annual Meetings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1954, at 1. The company’s “mammoth” meeting welcomed 2,455 shareholders that year. Alfred R. Zipser, Jr., G.E. Profits Set Peak in Quarter at $48,029,000, Up 42% in Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1954, at 45. Although some meetings were attended by thousands of shareholders, those present represented only a fraction of the overall shareholder population. And in 1949, the Wall Street Journal noted that “[b]lack attendance and scant comment still typify most corporate meetings.” Owners Arise! Annual Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed Questioning, supra note 218.

362. For example, AT&T’s 1948 annual stockholder meeting was two hours long. Corporate Democracy, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps., Newark, N.J.), May 1948, at 1, 6-7. Its 1949 meeting lasted four and a half hours. See Owners Arise! Annual Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed Questioning, supra note 218. Its 1950 annual meeting lasted almost seven hours. 950 at Its Stockholders’ Meeting, a Record in History of A.T.&T., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1950, at 45.


365. For example, shareholder activists pushed for regional shareholder meetings to encourage greater shareholder participation. General Mills held the first such meetings in 1939 and 1940, in major cities like New York, San Francisco, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The company reported that about half of its shareholders in the San Francisco
hold diversified portfolios of stock. With governance rights in few firms, it would have been possible for shareholders to devote attention to the obligations of economic citizenship. They were stymied by corporate-governance practices that discouraged their participation and by the lack of transportation and communication technology that might have allowed distant shareholders to attend meetings or vote their own shares.

The passivity thesis has had an enduring influence on the evolution of American corporate-governance theory and law. By characterizing dispersed shareholding as inherently passive, Berle and Means's popularization of the passive-shareholder trope foreclosed serious consideration of how corporate law discouraged small shareholders from participating in governance. The word “passive” itself has been widely deployed in legal scholarship on corporate and securities law with a range of meanings applied to corporate boards, shareholders, and investment strategies. For example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel famously argued for a “rule of managerial passivity” in takeover law. A recent trend in scholarship has described index investing as “passive” investing. In a thoughtful article, Adriana Robertson has argued that describing stock market indices as “passive”

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366. See supra note 41.

367. After the 1932 publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, shareholder passivity became an important theme in corporate law and theory. See, e.g., Chester Rohrlich, Law and Practice in Corporate Control 8 (1933) (describing “the separation between those who actively controlled and operated the corporation and those who passively awaited dividends”).

368. In their book, Berle and Means discussed changes to corporate law that had disempowered stockholders. See Berle & Means, supra note 35, at 153-88. However, they did not argue in favor of changing corporate law to re-empower shareholders.


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obsures important truths about them.\textsuperscript{371} Some scholars, including Bernard Black, have suggested that "the standard model [of corporate governance] overstates the case for passivity."\textsuperscript{372}

When the law-and-economics movement emerged in the 1970s, it embraced shareholder passivity and refashioned it as "rational apathy." In this view, the "natural" passivity of dispersed shareholders evidenced a "free rider problem" and could be explained by incentives operating on \textit{homo economicus}.\textsuperscript{373} In the 1980s, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explained that:

Most shareholders are passive investors seeking liquid holdings. They have little interest in managing the firm and less incentive to learn the details of management. . . . Because other shareholders take a free ride on any one shareholder's monitoring, each shareholder finds it in his self-interest to be passive.\textsuperscript{374}

Berle and Means had problematized passivity, presenting it as a blameworthy debasement of shareholding that justified stockholders' loss of prerogatives. The law-and-economics movement reimagined passivity as rational decisionmaking by overextended, welfare-maximizing investors.\textsuperscript{375} Passivity had ceased to be a problem, and had become a solution to a problem—the problem of "bounded resources." Once reconceived this way, passivity seemed rational, even desirable.\textsuperscript{376} Corporate law no longer had to worry about fixing shareholder passivity and could focus on reducing agency costs. Business law scholars began writing reflexively about "rationally passive" shareholders.\textsuperscript{377} In turn, shareholders' rational passivity caused them to

\textsuperscript{371.} See Adriana Z. Robertson, \textit{Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and "Index" Investing}, 36 YALE J. REG. 795, 797 (2019) ("Far from being passive, [U.S. stock market] indices represent the deliberate decisions made by their managers.").

\textsuperscript{372.} Black, \textit{supra} note 290, at 822.

\textsuperscript{373.} See Black, \textit{supra} note 282, at 522 ("Most modern corporate scholars, especially those with a law-and-economics bent, accept shareholder passivity as inevitable.").

\textsuperscript{374.} Easterbrook & Fischel, \textit{supra} note 344, at 1171.

\textsuperscript{375.} See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop, \textit{Activist Directors and Agency Costs}, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381, 443 (2019) ("Passive investors are passive because they logically prefer liquidity to control.").

\textsuperscript{376.} See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, \textit{In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green}, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1430 n.20 (1993) (arguing that to "require shareholders to actively participate in firm management" in a "large firm" would "result in chaos").

\textsuperscript{377.} See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, \textit{supra} note 282, at 895 ("As in the standard Berle–Means analysis, beneficial owners are rationally passive; governance rights are of little value to them.").
devalue control rights; law-and-economics scholars explained that the only thing a rational shareholder cared about was stock price.\textsuperscript{378}

The rise of intermediation in the 1960s and 1970s, which shifted investment away from retail shareholding, did not just obscure the gender of shareholding and return voting control to male investment managers. It also encouraged the use of diversification as an investment strategy, which turned the “rationally passive” shareholder into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whereas before 1960 most shareholders held stock in relatively few companies, diversified investors held equity interests in many companies. As the number of companies in their stock portfolios grew—and in the absence of mechanisms that would have made collective action possible—the average investor did eventually hold a portfolio of stock in too many companies to participate actively in shareholder governance in all of them.\textsuperscript{379} Thus, inattentiveness to company-level governance did eventually become a feature of modern investment.

Today, business law scholars describe managerial capitalism as a time when small shareholders lacked both “the aptitude” and “the inclination” to participate in corporate affairs.\textsuperscript{380} This version of history elides how gender bias may have influenced views about shareholders—what they were capable of and their suitability for shareholder governance—in the early development of corporate-governance theory. Ideas about how small shareholders were

\textsuperscript{378} Ralph Winter told a Senate subcommittee in 1977 that “the great bulk of shareholders in the United States do not regard shareholder power as being a very important issue to them and certainly do not regard it as anything directly related to the yield on their investments.” \textit{The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and S’holders Rights and Remedies of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 80 (1977) (statement of Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Professor of Law, Yale University)}; see also James D. Nelson, \textit{The Freedom of Business Association}, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 497 (2015) (noting that shareholder passivity “leads individual shareholders to value the corporations in which they invest primarily, if not exclusively, for the instrumental financial returns they promise”).

\textsuperscript{379} One articulation of the standard view is found in Bainbridge, \textit{supra} note 378, at 1430 n.20 (“Shareholders want to be passive investors holding a diverse portfolio of many stocks. Fully diversified shareholders have neither the time nor the resources to monitor actively the conduct of a particular corporation’s business or the solvency of their fellow shareholders.”).

\textsuperscript{380} See Brian R. Cheffins, \textit{The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle–Means Corporation}, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 445, 447 (2019); Easterbrook & Fischel, \textit{supra} note 344, at 397 (stating that Berle and Means believed “the passive investors have neither the willingness nor the ability to manage”).
“irresponsible,”381 “docile,”382 “supine,”383 “weak,”384 in need of education,385 and “not qualified to challenge the judgment of management”386 echoed negative stereotypes about women, who made up a significant proportion of small shareholders. Evidence establishes that the passive woman–active man stereotype has distorted even scientific understandings about molecular biology.387 It is not much of a stretch to conclude that gender bias, common to this period in history, prompted male business leaders to view small shareholders as unsuited to a role in shareholder governance in part because they included so many women.

Today, there is little to suggest that the trope of the passive shareholder retains gender-coded meaning. It is unlikely that twenty-first-century corporate law scholars who write about “passive shareholders” intend to vest the phrase with sexist meaning. Corporate law theory would benefit, however, from deeper thinking about the passive–active dichotomy so prevalent in the literature. That dichotomy may have obscured an interest on the part of some shareholders to actively participate in the management of public companies. Consideration of the trope’s gendered origin may, in fact, shed light on the current (and rising) popularity of shareholder activism, a trend that undermines the traditional view, typically asserted as a fact, that shareholders care only about stock price.

C. Gender and Stakeholderism

At the end of their book, Berle and Means asked: Who should receive the profits of industry?388 Their answer gave voice to a developing trend in

381. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 354.
382. SEARS, supra note 58, at 62.
383. Id.
385. Slocum, supra note 246, at 10.
387. For example, biologists misunderstood the process of fertilization for years because they assumed that (male) sperm was the aggressor in fertilization and the (female) egg was merely a “passive” recipient. Research in the 1980s disproved this characterization, which attributed stereotypes about human behavior to molecular processes. See Evelyn Fox Keller, Gender and Science: Origin, History and Politics, 10 OSIRIS 27, 34-35 (1995) (quoting Emily Martin, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male–Female Roles, 16 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 485, 489 (1991)); Martin, supra, at 492 (describing how the erroneous narrative was “rewritten in a biophysics lab at Johns Hopkins University—transforming the egg from the passive to the active party”).
388. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 340-44.
business law that cast corporate leaders as “industrial statesmen” and empowered them to operate the corporation in the best interests of society, according to their own views about what that meant.389

Berle and Means argued not only that passive stock ownership was “irresponsible,” but also that “the owners of passive property, by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest.”390 In other words, Berle and Means believed that shareholders’ passivity justified a move away from treating shareholders’ interests as primary, opening up the possibility that shareholders’ interests would be subordinated to those of other groups, such as labor and consumers. As punishment for shareholders’ passivity, Berle and Means would remove shareholders from the center of the enterprise to the periphery and give corporate managers the power to balance their interests against those of other stakeholders. This was a significant loss of shareholders’ rights, and Berle and Means acknowledged as much.

The demotion of shareholders’ interests from primacy to equal footing with the interests of labor and other stakeholders would today be called “stakeholderism.”391 Although the word “stakeholderism” was not in use during managerial capitalism, many business leaders and corporate law scholars of that era endorsed ideas that would be described today as “stakeholder values.”392 Berle and Means wrote that it was “almost essential”

389. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444 (2001) (describing “an important strain of normative thought from the 1930s through the 1960s that extolled the virtues of granting substantial discretion to the managers of large business corporations” who would “guide business corporations to perform in ways that would serve the general public interest”); HENRY MON MAURER, GREAT ENTERPRISE: GROWTH AND BEHAVIOR OF THE BIG CORPORATION 268 (1955) (describing Owen Young, the chairman of General Electric, as an “industrial statesman”).

390. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 354-55; id. at 356 (noting that the control groups “have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society”).

391. For a discussion of stakeholderism and its meanings, see generally Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 123, 127-32 (2016) (defining stakeholderism to mean that, since corporations have “broader obligations to society... directors should consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders such as employees, customers, creditors, the environment, and the community, and balance those interests with profit goals”).

392. For an early articulation of stakeholder values, see Marple, supra note 215, at 12 (“[T]he management of Monsanto, or of any other company owned by thousands of persons and organizations, functions just as the management, or government, of a democracy functions—in the interests of everyone concerned.”). For an example of the term “stakeholder values” in recent use, see Jayne W. Barnard, At the Top of the Pyramid: Lessons from the Alpha Women and the Elite Eight, 65 Md. L. Rev. 315, 316, 318 (2006) (developing and discussing a “stakeholder sensitivity index” (capitalization altered)).
for control of public companies to “develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”

Once we bring the feminization of capital to the foreground, Berle and Means’s depiction of “passive” shareholding—that it debased shareholding, and that shareholders’ passivity justified the subordination of their interests—appears to reinforce themes of gender bias that were common in that era. Over the next decades, the passivity thesis justified both the assumption of corporate control by managers and the shift of corporate resources away from shareholders to other groups, such as labor. In both instances, power and surplus were transferred away from a group that included many women to groups that included few of them.

In August 2019, the Business Roundtable returned stakeholderism to the national conversation with a public statement signed by 181 leading CEOs. The statement expressed a commitment to deliver value to all of a business’s stakeholders, not merely shareholders. In response to the Business Roundtable statement and subsequent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the stock market crash of 2020, a growing literature has examined the stakeholder theory of corporate governance. What the literature makes clear is that, like the version of stakeholderism that was popular during managerial capitalism, this new stakeholderism expresses power through corporate governance. It advances a theory about how the corporate surplus should be allocated, and whose interests within the corporation should predominate. In evaluating new claims about the benefits of stakeholderism, corporate theorists should recall the feminization of capital and consider the gendered nature of power expressed through corporate governance. Even today, women constitute a small

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393. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 356.
394. Cf. Mandell, supra note 357, at 503 (noting the reconfiguration of “the Victorian equivalency between manhood and entrepreneurial independence into a twentieth-century equivalency between manhood and managerial status”).
397. See, e.g., GRANT M. HAYDEN & MATTHEW T. BODIE, RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION: FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO SHARED GOVERNANCE 159 (2020) (observing that “stakeholder theory seems content with the current power structure”).
D. Gender and the “Average” Shareholder

Much of the earliest economic reasoning applied to corporate law built upon assumptions about the interests of the “average” stockholder. Bayless Manning typified this when, in 1958, he asserted that “the average investor” “is an economic investor,” and “[t]he appeal of common stock to the average investor lies in its peculiar economic features—greater return, speculative potential and inflationary hedge.”\(^{399}\) In addition, the archetype of the “reasonable investor” casts a long shadow over financial regulation.\(^{400}\) Where do women fit into these paradigms? As the number of women in the shareholder class grew to exceed the number of men, business experts sidestepped the “statistical side of the story” to perpetuate a myth that stockholding was predominantly male.\(^{401}\) To the extent that leading business experts, like Manning, reasoned from their own assumptions about the identity of “the average investor,” and in light of the reality of women’s significant shareholding, we might ask whether it mattered that women were left out of the story.

1. Curating the image of stockholding as male

In the 1950s and 1960s, many important business organizations portrayed shareholding—falsely—as the business of men. Examples abound. In 1955, three important companies publicly celebrated a milestone stockholder, just as AT&T had celebrated its millionth shareholder in 1951.\(^{402}\) The companies were General Motors, Standard Oil New Jersey, and General Electric. All three

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398. See AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 37 (2015) (“Women, who make up a slim majority of the population, occupy slightly less than 17 percent of spots in Fortune 500 boardrooms and just 3.1 percent of board chair positions.”).

399. Manning, supra note 252, at 1492.


401. Livingston, supra note 229 (conceding the “statistical side of the story” but arguing that “[m]any women own stock in name only” because “women in our society have a big enough job—raising children and running the household”).

402. See supra notes 1-2.
chose a male stockholder to celebrate, even though all three had more women shareholders than men. In fact, the milestone shareholder at all three companies shared a particular set of demographic characteristics: He was white, married, young, and middle class, and, in at least two of the three cases, a father of young children. Standard Oil New Jersey celebrated its 300,000th shareholder—a twenty-three-year-old white male employee at an Oklahoma subsidiary—and showed him with his unidentified wife in photos taken at the annual meeting:

Later in the same meeting, however, Standard Oil’s president acknowledged that more women than men were shareholders of the company,


404. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), supra note 405, at 12 (portraying the couple). I have inferred race from the photo.
“by a considerable majority.” 405 All of these companies were actively curating their public images by presenting their “average” stockholder as male.

The NYSE’s 1962 shareowner census provides another example. One of the headline findings of the census was that women shareholders outnumbered men. A reader who opened the glossy pages of the report found the photographs of seven individuals whose images recurred throughout the publication, with a caption explaining that “[t]he seven people whose photos appear throughout this booklet represent in many ways a cross-section of American shareowners today.” 406 But six of the seven stockholders pictured were men:

![Image of seven stockholders](image_url)

The images powerfully distorted the reader’s impression of the gender makeup of American stockholding. The idea, apparently, was to present shareholding as something that men did, even though the publication’s own study proved empirically that most individual shareholders were women.

2. Women’s economic interest in gender equity

It is likely that women’s interests as shareholders were (and are) similar to those of men. 407 But women shareholders expressed a special interest in at least one documented area: corporate policies concerning gender equality. Especially after World War II, women shareholders used shareholder activism to try to open up corporate management opportunities for women. The widespread economic discrimination experienced by women in the early twentieth

405. Id. at 15.
406. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE 17 MILLION, supra note 224, at i.
407. Research for this article did not identify any sex-disaggregated studies of shareholder interests from the first half of the twentieth century.
century prompted them, as “owners” of enterprise, to pursue what are today widely viewed as “social” goals within firms.408

In addition to her campaign to put women on boards of directors, for example, activist Wilma Soss challenged corporate policies that required women employees to retire at age fifty-five—ten years before men were required to retire, and five years before the age at which a woman was eligible for Social Security benefits. Although women shareholders’ efforts ultimately failed to open up corporate boards to women, there is evidence that activists succeeded at changing some companies’ sex-based retirement policies.409

Assumptions about the “average” stockholder that erased women also erased these “social” interests from shareholder governance. Bayless Manning might have been correct when he asserted that “the average investor” was “an economic investor,” but he was wrong to the extent that he assumed this interest was limited to stock price410 and economic returns. Inequitable gender-based corporate policies of the era were economic matters for women.

E. Women and Corporate Control

This Article opened with an account of AT&T’s 1951 shareholders’ meeting, where women shareholders demanded board representation, citing women’s significant shareholding and employment at the company.411 Women shareholders had outnumbered men at AT&T since at least 1910, and had been demanding board gender diversity there since at least 1933.412 Yet women shareholders would wait almost forty years for the first woman candidate to be nominated by management for election to AT&T’s board—and only then in apparent response to high-profile sex discrimination charges against the company.413 AT&T’s story reveals the enduring resistance that

408. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 650 (2016) (describing board diversity as one of several “topics generally considered to be ‘social’ goals of niche investors”).

409. See Women Stockholders Ready for New Fight, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1951, at 2 (describing a fight over women’s mandatory age of retirement at Standard Oil New Jersey that ended with the company raising the age requirement to sixty years); STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), 70TH ANNUAL MEETING 15-17 (1952) (memorializing a discussion at the stockholder meeting about raising women’s mandatory age of retirement to sixty-five years).

410. Manning, supra note 252, at 1492.

411. See supra text accompanying notes 9-27.

412. See supra note 7; Merryle Rukeyser, Women Would Aid Business as Directors, PITT. SUN TELEGRAPH, Apr. 18, 1933, at 25.

413. The first woman nominated by AT&T’s management to its board of directors was Catherine Cleary. See Gene Smith, Woman Nominated to A.T.&T. Board, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1972, at 47. At the time, AT&T was fighting high-profile charges of employment discrimination against women. See Abbott Combes, EEOC Bias Report Calls
women shareholders faced, for most of the twentieth century, when they sought to leverage their significant shareholding into managerial power at public companies.

In 1949, Sidney Weinberg, the chairman of Goldman Sachs and a director at more than thirty big companies, including General Electric, wrote in the pages of the Harvard Business Review that he saw "no reason why a competent woman should not be elected to the board, especially now when some companies have more women than men as stockholders."\(^{414}\) Weinberg had served for years on the board of General Foods alongside Marjorie Post Davies, one of the first women directors of a major U.S. company.\(^{415}\) Davies, credited with leading General Foods to become (to great profit) a pioneer in frozen food, had gained a seat on the board of General Foods in 1936 because she was the company’s largest stockholder.\(^{416}\)

In the early 1950s, two big public companies, Western Union and Radio Corporation of America (RCA), responded to the demands of women stockholders by adding a woman to their boards. Western Union, whose shareholders had been evenly divided by gender since the nineteenth century, was experiencing serious investor dissatisfaction.\(^{417}\) The company added Madeleine Edison Sloane, the daughter of Thomas Edison, to its board in 1950,
shortly after a relatively young new president, Walter Marshall, took the helm.\footnote{See First Woman Is Named to Western Union Board, CHARLOTTE NEWS, Oct. 26, 1950, at 43; Walter P. Marshall Elected President of Western Union, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1948, at 39.} That same year, after being targeted for activism by women investors,\footnote{Logan, supra note 27, at 48 (describing Soss's efforts to have a woman nominated to the RCA board).} RCA added Mildred McAfee Horton, the former president of Wellesley College, to the board of its subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company.\footnote{R.C.A. Elects Woman to Board of Directors, BALT. SUN, Oct. 6, 1951, at 16.} After Horton’s tenure was judged a success, RCA added Horton to its own board in October 1951.\footnote{Id.; Madam Director, TIME, Oct. 15, 1951, at 112, 112.}

Thus, by 1951, three major companies had a woman on their board of directors: one as a result of sheer shareholding power (General Foods), one at a company with a significant number of women stockholders and stockholder dissatisfaction (Western Union), and one at a company that had apparently acted to preempt an activist campaign by women stockholders (RCA).

In the 1950s, two other major American companies ended up with women directors due to proxy fights. In both cases—the New York Central Railroad proxy fight of 1954 and the Montgomery Ward proxy fight of 1955—an insurgent trying to gain control of the company put a woman on his board slate to attract votes from women stockholders. At New York Central, the insurgent won, and Lila Bell Acheson Wallace became the first woman director of that company.\footnote{David Karr, Fight for Control 34, 38 (1956).} At Montgomery Ward, the incumbent president kept control through a last-minute deal with the Teamsters union, which pledged to vote its shares for management. Nonetheless, the insurgent group won three seats on the nine-person board.\footnote{Id. at 165-66.} Bernice Fitz-Gibbon, an advertising executive, was elected to one of those seats, but served only a single year.\footnote{Id. at 165, 168; Richard J.H. Johnston, 3 of 9 Ward Seats Won by Wolfson, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1955, at 23.}

Around this time, the term “Aunt Janes” became common slang for small shareholders, reflecting the significant proportion of small shareholders who were women.\footnote{See, e.g., Karr, supra note 424, at 15, 27, 35, 38 (discussing the role of “Aunt Janes” in the New York Central Railroad proxy fight); Aunt Janes and Millionaires, LIFE, June 7, 1954, at 34, 34; Lewis D. Gilbert, Dividends and Democracy 7, 99 (1956). By the 1980s, “Aunt Jane,” and the related “Aunt Millie,” were recognized as derogatory terms. See, e.g., John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman, Barron’s Finance & Investment Handbook 205 (2003) (defining “Aunt Millie” as a “derogatory term for an unsophisticated investor”).} Although the term would eventually be used pejoratively, it
originated in the New York Central proxy fight in a favorable context. To win control in what would be a very close race, Robert Young needed the company's women shareholders to vote for his takeover bid. So, he added a woman to his slate of board candidates, and he won the vote. "Robert R. Young's victory proved that it is often the Aunt Janes who hold the key to victory," one writer acknowledged.

The story of how women gained board seats at some of the nation's most important public companies in the early 1950s reveals something important about gender and corporate power. In the middle of the twentieth century, women were able to gain representation on corporate boards only by leveraging their shareholding power; contests for corporate control were an opening for women, but only through the decisions of male business leaders to nominate women to board slates in the first place. Outside these circumstances, women's demands for representation were met with resistance rooted in gender bias.

Indeed, evidence suggests that women's demands for board representation at AT&T led the company to cease its longstanding practice of disclosing sex-disaggregated data about its shareholders in its company reports. AT&T published information about the percentage of women shareholders in its annual reports every year from 1910 to 1950, with only a few exceptions. However, after women activists cited this data to support their claim for board gender diversity at an April 1951 shareholder meeting, AT&T again did not publish the percentage of its shareholders who were women—with one exception in 1960. This lack of disclosure helped obscure the gender of AT&T's stockholders, which may in turn have reduced the ability of shareholder activists to make claims for women's board representation.

In the twenty-first century, a growing body of literature has puzzled over the lack of women on public-company boards. That literature has proposed a range of explanations and solutions, but it has rarely plumbed history for clues.

427. KARR, supra note 424, at 38.
428. For examples of gender bias regarding women board candidates, see supra note 153.
429. My review of AT&T's annual reports from 1900 to 1985 found that AT&T reported information about the sex of its stockholders from 1910 to 1926; omitted sex-disaggregated data in 1927 and 1928; reported on stockholder sex in 1929; omitted sex-disaggregated data in 1930 and 1931; and then consistently reported sex-disaggregated data from 1932 to 1950. AT&T's 1950 annual report, published in early 1951, was the last annual report to contain sex-disaggregated data, with the exception of its 1960 annual report. See AT&T 1950 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15; AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT 1960, at 7 (1961) [hereinafter AT&T 1960 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that 42% of share owners were women; 21% were men; 31% were joint accounts; and 6% were "other").
430. See AT&T 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 431, at 7.
about the problem. The feminization of capital adds a new dimension to this story by showing that, even when women were widely recognized as a significant—even dominant—demographic among shareholders, social forces and gender politics limited their ability to exercise corporate control. The feminization of capital, and its subsequent erasure from memory, point us at persistent problems with the gendered nature of corporate power. These phenomena also reveal that we still have important, and surprising, lessons to learn from our own history.

Conclusion

From its beginning, modern corporate capitalism involved meaningful participation by women in share ownership. Among the three groups whose interrelation defined twentieth-century corporate capitalism—labor, capital, and management—capital was the first to show significant female participation. By comparison, women did not become a major part of the wage-earning labor force until the second half of the twentieth century, and achieved near parity of numbers with men in the work force only at the century’s end. Over the same period, women never held a significant proportion of managerial jobs, particularly at the top of the corporate hierarchy. By synthesizing a history of modern corporate capitalism that recognizes women as a major shareholder demographic, this Article makes an important, original contribution to the corporate law literature. It has shown that the emergence and growth of stock markets transformed women’s roles as economic actors, providing them not only with opportunities to invest and finance businesses as risk-bearers, but to participate in the management of business through share voting—and that women’s growing numbers and active participation in shareholder governance were influential to contemporaneous business leaders.

Women’s significant role in public-company shareholding likely influenced the path of American corporate governance. While this Article has


432. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance, 21 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 105, 108 (2018) (stating that in 2017, women held only 19.8% of board seats of companies in the Fortune 1,000); Fuchs, supra note 433, at 14 (noting that “over two-thirds” of women’s gain in “higher-level professional and managerial occupations” occurred after 1975).
not attempted to catalog every dimension of that influence, it poses some fundamental questions that cut to the heart of modern corporate law theory. In light of the historical evidence presented in this Article, corporate law must revisit some familiar ideas. Is a separation of ownership and control really the core division of corporate organization? Do owners have to be “weak,” and managers “strong”? In the midst of changing shareholder demographics, why did corporate law move in a direction that favored market-based solutions rather than collective action by shareholders as a means to curb managerial power? Is the condition of stockholding really inherently passive? And, nearly seventy years after women first outnumbered men as shareholders at American public companies, why are women still largely excluded from the management of those companies? The historical record suggests that an influx of women to shareholding in the early twentieth century shaped the contours of modern corporate law in ways that, until now, have been hidden from view.